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Responding to growing efforts to bring philosophy into K-12 schools in the U.S., 
this dissertation takes up pedagogical and political concepts used by Jacques Rancière in 
order to reflect on the motivating principles and limitations of bringing philosophy to 
schools. Rancière critiques schooling as a mechanism by which socio-economic inequality 
is justified and argues that academic philosophy, following the rationalist tradition 
attributed to Plato, is in fact complicit in this justificatory process. Given his staunch 
position, it might seem that it is impossible to implement philosophy in schools using 
Rancièrian principles. I argue that there is a practice of philosophy in schools to which 
Rancière may be sympathetic on a theoretical level. In order to support my position, the 
principle aim of this work is to provide evidence that Rancière’s works reflect specific 
critiques and alternative values of both schooling and philosophy that are also represented 
in the principled pedagogical practice of community of philosophical inquiry (CPI). I begin 
to think through the possibility of CPI in new and existing schools, as well the way that the 
notion of possibility itself figures into this line of inquiry. My thesis is that CPI is the 
philosophical practice most appropriate for schools given the critiques and alternative 
values of schooling and philosophy shared by Rancière and CPI, but that Rancière may 
help to inform the way the practice is implemented. 
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 There are a number of ways that I find Jacques Rancière to be a fascinating study 
for important questions and themes discussed in contemporary academic scholarship 
within philosophy of education, but I ascend to this level of scholarship by starting with a 
look at my high school experience. Although there may be limitations to substantiating 
one’s research based on biographical facts, the messy narrative of my attendance in that 
first public high school – the same one from which I ended up graduating after attending 
two other schools in the interim, and the same school at which I first began to think 
critically about  schooling – acts not only as a partial motivation for my project, but 
provides a relatable example that I will draw on occasionally throughout the dissertation. 
By inquiring into Rancière’s work, I continue to discover avenues for inquiry that pertain 
not merely to my own experiences in schools, but also to topics I have become drawn to 
since entering college and throughout graduate school. 
As a brief disclaimer about this tale of my teenage disappointment with school, I 
should say that to this day I am still not entirely sure whether or not I was justified in 
feeling disappointment in my school experience. After all, with the dramatic and emotional 
changes taking place at home, it may be that I was simply projecting my familial 
disappointments onto my educational experience. Maybe I should have become motivated 
to study different factors that had impacted my home life rather than ending with a 
motivation to make whole new schools based on philosophy. Maybe there is nothing that 
my school could have done. I could have done the right thing, continued as a high-
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achieving student, and lived through the rocky time in my life without ever becoming 
disgruntled with schooling.  But in fact, I blamed many things on the schools I attended, 
and this is the tale of how I did that, and how that blame has led to my current study.  
In Elementary School I was in Gifted and Talented Education classes starting in 
third grade and was in advanced classes in Middle School as well, excitedly doing 
homework each day after school, soaking up the subject matter. My parents had divorced 
when I was five, so my brother and I spent ten years switching each week between our 
parents’ houses. Even though I did not have a perfectly stable life at home, I managed to 
consistently do well in school. This all changed in the summer before tenth grade, when 
my mother went through her second divorce and I moved in with her permanently. I 
became a fifteen-year-old who was skipping classes and drinking liquor with friends after 
school. 
As a fifteen-year-old going through difficulties at home, I spent hours, including 
class time, creating a self-published magazine (or zine), which I titled Wizdumb. In this 
zine I published pieces that were critical of school and society. I had been inspired by zines 
I had seen at record stores and concert venues I frequented – all part of the Punk Rock 
community. I was able to print the first issue thanks to my English teacher who ran copies 
for me from the teacher’s lounge. Other issues I was able to print at the local copy stores. 
While I did the designing and most of the content, I also accepted submissions from 
friends at my school. While some of my pieces were critical of home life and my parents, 
the central focus was on the failings of school. Again, one could say that I had misplaced 
the blame, and that school was not the problem. Underlying my criticisms of my school, 
vii 
 
however, was the assumption that it could be something different, and that I was capable of 
something different; I had the sense that my potential was being thwarted, and that this was 
true for many other students. Having loved school for so many years and having felt at 
home there – inspired by teachers, excited about my abilities, curious – I now felt uncared 
for, as teachers seemed willing for me to fail out of their classes, never expecting more, 
never looking into the reasons for such failure. It remains a question for me as to whether I 
should have or could have had a stronger will and remained a successful student all those 
years, and whether schooling could have helped if my schools were different. The topic of 
the will is one that is still relevant to me to today, as is the question of the responsibility of 









After dropping out of my original high school at age fifteen, I was able to attend a 
charter high school where my mom had quite serendipitously found a temporary position 
as a secretary. It was a great two semesters of self-paced classes, where I read many 
important socially critical books at my own pace, working one-on-one with teachers. 
Although I had already heard of the word anarchism through punk rock bands I was 
listening to at the time, an English teacher at this charter school give me a flyer that 
detailed more about the theory. This would prove to have an impact on my development 
and is now a theory that I find interesting to consider in light of Rancière’s works.  
The two semesters I spent at that charter school were very positive but were 
followed by a move back to a new public high school when my mom and I moved in with 
a new boyfriend of hers on the other side of the city. I continued publishing my zine at this 
new school, where I once again felt jaded by schooling. After she and that boyfriend broke 
up, my mom and I moved back to our original neighborhood, I moved back into my 
original high school, and on the urgent printing of the fifth issue of my magazine, I 
graduated high school. To explain this urgent printing: because I received an F in my first-
period Ceramics class my senior year, due to tardiness, a special deal had to be worked out 
between my Ceramics teacher and my counselor. The F was impacting my GPA such that I 
would not be able to graduate high school if I did not receive a passing grade in that first 
period class. My Ceramics teacher allowed me to create any work of art to supplement the 
ceramics instruction I had missed. I thus submitted a small zine on the topic of art and was 
given the passing grade I needed in order to graduate. 
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As should come as no surprise, college was not on my radar at the time I received 
my diploma. I did not plan to go to college, but evidenced by a number of drawings I had 
created, I wanted to one day open a very different kind of high school. I pictured an 
entirely self-sufficient school where students could run their own shops (bookstores, record 
stores, coffee shops, etc.), grow their own food, collect solar energy, construct the 
buildings, and self-govern. The goal of this dream-campus would not be for students to 
graduate and move on, but instead to thrive while at school. If students raised questions 
about the purpose of what we were reading in a class, the question would not be brushed 
aside as disruptive of the end-goals, but seen as the start of a conversation worth having. 
While this continues to motivate me today, I am still not sure that I was correct in placing 
so much expectation on my schools to help me in life, nor am I sure that making schools 
more capable of offering this help is a valid hope to hold on to today. Indeed, many of the 
critiques of high school that I had as an anarcho-curious teenager and that I still hold today 
are critiques of the system of schooling in relation to the larger socio-economic context. 
There is an extent to which making better schools will not fix the larger problems that are 
related to, but perhaps ultimately outside of, schooling. This challenge of wanting to 
improve schools while also believing that they are part of a broken system continues for 
me to this day and is a running theme in Rancière’s work – a theme he addresses in part by 
way of his notion of the police order.  
Would a better school, such as those for which I drew blueprints in my high school 
journals, have helped me through those difficult times? Are schools meant to help in that 
way? If not, what are they good for? Are schools just about allowing those with the will 
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and the support to succeed, while further disenfranchising or keeping stagnant those 
without will? Is the student’s environment outside the school the most important factor in 
their success? Is there some societal value that emerges from schooling that does not 
necessarily feel beneficial to every individual? Should I interpret my failings in school as 
valuable nonetheless? If we were to look at this same scenario but I was a person of color, 
LGBTQ, or otherwise had cards stacked against me in terms of privilege in our society, 
would we answer these questions in the same way?  
If I were to stop the narrative at the high school level, I would have a good 
justification for studying someone like Rancière, who grapples with the question of how a 
state institution such as a school does or does not contribute to genuine possibilities for 
students, and who grapples with the question of the role of the will in relation to realization 
of possibilities or one’s potential. As I previously suggested, however, the reasons for 
studying Rancière are not derivable from my high school experiences alone. 
To summarize the next expanse of time after barely graduating high school, I did 
not swiftly enter into college. Given my political commitments to grassroots living, I was 
skeptical about the need for a degree. I joined an anarchist collective, hitch-hiked to anti-
war marches, continued publishing zines, and was not invested in going through traditional 
channels in order to make changes in the world – a general orientation that is also 
supported by Rancière’s arguments regarding politics. My critique of wisdom, a la 
Wizdumb, was heartfelt and lived. One could also analyze this phase of my life and 
propose that my lifestyle choices were a response to a rootless home life growing up. My 
commitment was to a life of integrity according to what I felt was right, and this meant that 
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I rejected a lot of the traditional models for success and normalcy: I didn’t shave my legs, 
rarely bought new clothes, biked instead of owning a car, and so on. Suffice it to say that 
deciding to enroll in two philosophy courses at Concordia University in Montreal, after 
hitchhiking throughout the U.S., France, England, the Netherlands, and Canada, took some 
evolution on my part.  
This evolution involved a discipline of the will, in that I no longer told myself that I 
was incapable of flourishing in any sanctioned activity, academics being one of them. I had 
decided at the time that I wanted to be happy, that I wanted to help as many people as I 
could, and that I was not going to blame others for my failure to live up to my full 
potential. I decided to make certain compromises in my beliefs so that I could accomplish 
more important things like being satisfied with myself, being autonomous, and being able 
to help people. This was how I rationalized going to university, and how I would 
eventually adopt other lifestyle choices that seem to go along with being successful in 
academia: looking presentable, attending classes, complying with institutional policies, and 
renting rather than couch-surfing. Recognizing that I was responsible for my own life and 
that others also had to worry about their own, I developed a different kind of appreciation 
for people – transforming my attitude toward teachers into one in which I saw them as 
people living out their lives, rather than people who owed me something or were to blame 
for the problematic system(s) of which they were a part. In sum, I recognized that 
compromise was inevitable, and that I could still perhaps do well even within systems I felt 
were fraught with problems. I share this sentiment with Rancière who, though asserting the 
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inevitability of certain issues within any social institution or gathering, maintains a 
semblance of hope and keeps an appreciation for individuals at the core of his work.  
With this ambition to take charge of my life and to recognize where each person 
was in their own journey, I found myself on a farm in British Columbia. There, I was 
living while working as a cherry-picker over the summer, among college students from 
Quebec who were indulging in a carefree experience before returning to school. I was 
simply a “ragamuffin vagabond,” as my mom affectionately called me, traveling with no 
immediate plans. It was on that farm that, in speaking with Quebecois college students, I 
was told that I should read Plato, and that I would like him. That summer of cherry 
picking, talking with kindred spirits and reflecting on my life, set the stage for my decision 
to try to set down some roots in Montreal.  
 I had tried taking a few classes at a community college at the advice of my dad and 
stepmom a couple of years prior to that, one of which was Asian Philosophy. I had 
enrolled because I had an interest in Taoism; I had no idea what philosophy was. I had 
dropped out of those classes, so attending Concordia University in Montreal was the first 
time I was taking college seriously. In that first semester at Concordia, enrolled in two 
Philosophy courses due to the suggestion (by that friend on the cherry orchard) that I 
would like philosophy, I discovered that the magazine Wizdumb I had started in high 
school, being a critique of knowledge(s) in schools, family, and culture, was nascent 
philosophy. As a teen I had been disappointed by the norms I was compared against, the 
expectations I could not (or did not feel I could) live up to, and the contradictions I saw 
around me. I had questions that were left unanswered in classes. I felt lost regarding my 
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purpose, my value, my abilities. Upon learning that philosophy meant love of wisdom (I 
learned this in the course on Pre-Socratic Philosophy), it did not take long for me to make 
the connection that it was perhaps philosophy that had been missing in my high schools. In 
my understanding of this ancient practice, loving wisdom involves, among other things, 
contemplating the notion of wisdom and recognizing the wisdom you possess. As a teen, I 
was hung up on external standards of intelligence, success, and wisdom. I had lost the 
appreciation for wisdom that can be found within, wisdom that can legitimately be 
examined and explored rather than taken for granted as something external to oneself.  
A big part of what disappointed me in high school was the way in which the 
educative system, which I did not enter voluntarily, seemed to be unquestioned. Although I 
was disgruntled as a teen, I had to decide to either do what it took to pass the classes or 
fail. The standards by which I was compared were determined before I arrived at the 
school. I did not have the option of questioning the purpose of school, or the space to 
engage with ideas about what my own purpose might be. There did not seem to be 
possibility for engaging in school in a way in which I could contribute to changing it so 
that it was more suitable for a person such as myself, who was having a hard time in life. 
That lack of a space to be critically engaged and to be appreciated for my perspective is 
what I have since designated as a lack of being able to question, and ultimately an absence 
of philosophy. If there were a place in my public schools where questioning, examination 
of possibilities, and thinking for its own sake could have been nurtured, I think I would 
have felt more comfortable enduring uncertainty.   
xv 
 
Granting that we are required by law to be in school, one would think that school is 
supposed to have positive consequences, for surely a required four years in which harms 
are inflicted would seem more like a punishment. I spent four years going to different high 
schools, not by my own choice. When I turned eighteen I was legally responsible for my 
choices, but I do not feel that I had the proper support leading up to that point to be able to 
make informed choices. If school somehow damages students or makes their lives harder 
(by making them feel bad about themselves, by making employment more difficult, etc.) 
then perhaps the state ought to be held accountable for arguably inflicting such harms. 
Again, there are limitations to what a school ought to be expected to achieve, but these are 
some of the sentiments I struggled with as a teen and which I still ponder today. 
Given my experiences in high school and my later exposure to philosophy, shortly 
after declaring myself a Philosophy major I became driven to create a philosophy-based 
high school. In my master’s thesis on the topic I argued in part that a philosophy-based 
high school – wherein reason and reasons could be explored, and where the purpose of 
schooling could itself be problematized – would be a more hospitable place for the 
students otherwise ill-served by the school’s structure.1 While in college I have 
encountered arguments as to why reason and a search for objectivity may be problematic 
and may reinforce or justify systems of domination. Just before completing my thesis I 
discovered the sub-discipline of K-12 philosophers who have been working for decades to 
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help implement what I lacked in high school, and I have learned through this movement of 
some principles that also challenge my glorification of reason.  
When initially exposed to the Philosophy in Schools movement, I did not grasp all 
the varying approaches to bringing philosophy to schools, so I assumed that advocates 
were all about letting high school students read the same philosophical texts I was reading 
as an undergraduate. I came to find that there are different approaches, some of which 
hinge on divergent values rather than merely practical considerations. In learning about 
and studying philosophy for children and community of philosophical inquiry specifically, 
I have come to further question appeals to knowledge in the classroom, and indeed have 
come to see that the different methods of philosophizing in K-12 settings are based as 
much on principled values around schooling and philosophy as they are on practical 
considerations. Indeed, I have come to believe that community of philosophical inquiry 
best supports the vision I have in mind when I imagine how philosophy might help 
students in the way I wish I had been helped as a teen.  
There are a few things at work here and elucidating them will help to clarify why 
Rancière is so relevant to me. First, in my drive to open a philosophy-based high school 
there is an assumption that there is a certain kind of discourse – philosophy – that is not 
taking place in schools now. This requires a definition of philosophy and proof that it is 
distinct from other discourses, pedagogies, and academic subjects in schools. It also 
requires that the philosophy I propose can in fact happen at a school, and that it is not just a 
name for something fundamentally at odds with schooling. Secondly, there is an 
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assumption that this could somehow serve more students or be better for everyone – that if 
it can happen in schools, it should.  
To summarize, my trajectory since high school has been to remedy the deficiencies 
of that institution by insisting on a place for a love of wisdom within the space of school. Is 
this questioning process the same as reason, and does it necessarily have results that are 
good for people? Does philosophy offer us a special way in which we can critique 
injustices in schools, or give us tools to think through these issues? Can philosophy help us 
flourish? Can schools? As will be made clear in my description of his critiques and values 
of both schooling and philosophy, Rancière is a philosopher who can help to answer these 







Responding to growing efforts to bring philosophy into K-12 schools in the U.S., 
this dissertation takes up pedagogical and political concepts found in the works of Jacques 
Rancière in order to reflect on the relationship between traditional U.S. schooling and the 
values that may be inherent in the practice of philosophy.2 Rancière critiques schooling as 
a mechanism that reinforces and promotes socio-economic inequality. He also argues that 
academic philosophy – following the rationalist tradition attributed to Plato – is complicit 
in this justificatory process. Although Rancière admonishes reification of methods, this 
dissertation contends that community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) is a type of method 
that Rancière might consider valuable in contributing to better schools.3  
                                                     
2. Though my research could have involved philosophy in schools worldwide, I 
have focused specifically on the U.S. because I attend public school in the U.S. from grade 
kindergarten until I graduated high school, and thus understand some of the problems on a 
more personal level than if I were to assess problems found in public schools in other 
countries. As a further point, some countries see more success in bringing philosophy to 
public schools, so I gather that there is a special need to find out why it is so challenging to 
introduce philosophy to U.S. public schools.  
 
3. While community of inquiry was first referred to in the writings of Charles 
Pierce, I take up the community of philosophical inquiry methodology as proposed by 
Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp. Further discussion of this method and its 
principles follow, yet it is important to note here that for the remainder of this dissertation I 
refer to the community of philosophical inquiry coming out of the Lipman and Sharp 
literature, specifically in the context of U.S. K-12 schools unless otherwise stated. I should 




The underlying theme of this study should be of interest to scholars of Rancière, 
advocates of philosophy in schools, and others: it insists that everyone is fundamentally 
equal in their capacity to flourish, and considers how, through schooling, we might do a 
better job of acknowledging this equality in our society.4 This study takes as a starting 
point that schools are places wherein one can allegedly acquire the skills and social 
validation necessary to accomplish one’s aims. Specifically, U.S. K-12 education is framed 
as preparation for students to enter the work force or pursue further education before doing 
so, and in general, to find a place to survive within society. Because it appears that socio-
economic factors preclude all students from using their schooling to choose and show how 
they want to fit in to society, and since it is in the best interest of society to continually 
improve upon designated roles within society, my motivation for this dissertation is to 
critique any pretense that schools are objective arbiters of wisdom, credibility, or equality. 
Rather than assuming that students need to acquire certain skills that (“intelligent”) adults 
have, the Rancièrean assumption of equality of intelligence circumvents the requirement of 
transmitting or eliciting intelligence – the required bodies of knowledge for, among other 
                                                     
4. Even though Rancière does not make use of the term, I find it useful in light of 
my motivations to help students (I struggled in high school and am inspired in my 
scholarly work to contribute to better high school experiences for students). I use the term 
“flourish” without subscribing to a detailed conception of the term. I try to use it as a kind 
of placeholder. I have in mind that at minimum, flourishing describes the state of being 
wherein a person’s basic needs are met and they can live in a way such that they set goals 
and achieve them without impeding the flourishing of others. Whether one characterizes 
this flourishing as happiness or as the realization of one’s ‘potential,’ or as something else 
entirely, there are difficulties when it comes to assessment. In general, I have in mind that 
flourishing just means that a person has a life that they are grateful for; an element of self-
reflection or meta-cognition, indeed, seems necessary in order for us to be living and 
grateful to be living. 
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applications, certain job prospects – and instead compels one to consider the ways in which 
society might arrange itself in order to recognize and nurture the intrinsic intelligence, or 
equality, of its members. What might the purpose of schooling be if this equality of 
intelligence is inherent? 
Rancière is very skeptical about the possibility of radical change from within 
institutions, so it may seem that the attempt to disrupt inequality from within schools is 
inherently futile. A further issue is that for Rancière, if we insist that our aim is for schools 
to better contribute to student flourishing, self-efficacy, autonomy, or any such descriptors, 
there are difficulties due to the implied ability to measure them based on a universal 
metric. Rancière is not a utopian or teleological thinker. As such, my approach 
foregrounding this dissertation is to defend the idea that CPI can make U.S. K-12 schools 
better, yet to take seriously Rancière’s skepticism regarding this possibility and indeed, 
regarding the term better itself.  
My approach in bringing Rancière and CPI together is not to argue that the 
commonalities I draw out are comprehensive, representing all the themes and nuance 
found in each of the respective sets of literature. I also am not insisting that Rancière can 
only be interpreted and applied in this way, nor that CPI practitioners all endorse each of 
these values. What I do is pick out pieces of evidence and explore implications of different 
facets of both Rancière and CPI in order to share with the reader why it is that I believe 
they are so similar. I suggest that Rancière and CPI have in common certain critiques of 
schooling, namely inequality, stultification, truth, explanation, progress, and the police 
order. I assert that there are alternatives values pertaining to schooling that Rancière and 
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CPI share: the assumption of equality of intelligence, a belief in the separation between 
language and truth, and the value of dissensus. The positive conception of philosophy that 
I argue is supported by both Rancière and CPI entails the values of egalitarianism, 
assertion, and creativity or sitelessness. These values are meant to serve as alternatives to 
the problematic elements of elitism, method, and truth I show to be found in traditional 
philosophy. My thesis is that adopting a positive Rancièrean conception of philosophy may 
help U.S. K-12 CPI practitioners be more congnizant of the danger of replicating the same 
ills, or critiques of schooling and philosophy, that they are trying to combat when they face 
administrative, economic, and curricular challenges in their efforts to introduce and expand 
the practice in schools. 
 
Project Significance 
While there is a breadth of literature that takes up Rancière’s educationally relevant 
concepts as well as his criticisms of philosophy, there are only a few brief references to 
Rancière’s positive notions of philosophy.5 Because Rancière’s treatment of philosophy 
cannot be isolated from his commentary on social order and the function of schools, 
                                                     
5. Since 2003, Rancière has been mentioned forty five times in Studies in 
Philosophy and Education, with seventeen articles that focus mainly on him. He has been 
referenced in Educational Theory fifteen times, with nine of those articles featuring his 
work prominently, and articles focusing solely on him printed in 2010, 2012, and 2015. He 
has come up in twelve works in the Journal of Philosophy of Education since 2007, three 
of which focused primarily on him in 2009. In the 2013 issue of Philosophy of Education 
he was referenced twice, with one of the articles focusing heavily on him. In 2010 
Educational Philosophy & Theory created a special issue about his work, which was made 




focusing on this treatment offers a new lens through which to view CPI as a philosophical 
practice within schools – particularly when the practice is pitched as a remedy for various 
social ills including the aforementioned socio-economic inequality. There are a number of 
philosophers of education who have used Rancièrean notions in order to conceive of or 
theorize certain applications of such notions, so I am not alone in this endeavor. What is 
unique in my approach is that I am considering Rancière in light of contemporary efforts to 
bring philosophy into schools via CPI. I offer an interpretation of Rancière’s positive 
notion of philosophy and consider it in light of principles associated with CPI.  
This project is thus significant in a few different ways. This dissertation routes the 
terrain of the work done on Rancière within philosophy of education and charts the ways in 
which Rancière may be an unknowing ally to those who advocate for the use of CPI in 
U.S. K-12 schools. By looking closely at Rancière’s negative and positive notions of 
philosophy, as well as the ways in which CPI literature describes philosophy, it may help 
to challenge and reinvigorate both the discipline of philosophy and the practice of CPI. In 
bringing Rancière and CPI into conversation, the following two positions are challenged: 
that schools can never be emancipatory, and that bringing philosophy into schools will 
make them better. An important question informing my project can thus be put in this way: 
How might the articulation of a positive Rancièrean conception of philosophy help in 
understanding what is at stake in practicing CPI in U.S. K-12 schools? Having 





Context: Rancière’s Training, Influences, and Overarching Concepts 
Born in Algiers in 1940, Rancière received his formal training in philosophy at the 
École Normale Supérieure. Specializing in political philosophy and aesthetics, Rancière’s 
broad interests are equality and class struggle. Heavily influenced by his reading of Marx, 
Rancière worked as a doctoral student under the French Marxist philosopher Louis 
Althusser. He contributed to Althussers 1965 Reading Capital with other students of 
Althusser’s and was involved as an activist in the May 1968 protests.6 Rancière helped 
found the journal Revoltes Logiques in 1975. In the 1980’s, Rancière published his critique 
of Bourdieu’s The Inheritors, Reproduction, and Distinction when France welcomed a 
Socialist government that relied heavily on Bourdieu in its efforts to reduce inequality in 
education.7 He is currently a professor of philosophy at The European Graduate School and 
professor emeritus at the Université de Paris, VIII. He is best known for his works, The 
Philosopher and His Poor, The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation, The Nights of Labor: The Workers’ Dream in Nineteenth-Century France, 
The Emancipated Spectator, and Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy.8 
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8. Although his formal training is in philosophy, Rancière’s work and the 
secondary literature he inspires extends beyond its scope. He has given so many interviews 
within and outside of academia that in 2009 a 600-page collection of his interviews in 
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Rancière found shortcomings on the part of his mentor Althusser, taking issue with 
his notion that philosophy, and its alleged mastery of scientific reasoning methods, ought 
to intervene in order to help proletarians overcome their oppression.9 Frustration with this 
view motivated Rancière’s early archival work wherein his intention was to disprove the 
suggestion that proletarians cannot reason alone and are in need of philosophers to help 
with this task.10 Philosophizing about working class struggles does not do any good if in 
doing so it situates the philosopher as having more power than the working class. 
Rancière’s falling away from Althusser launched his series of critiques – particularly 
prominent in his book, The Philosopher and His Poor – against various philosophical 
schools and thinkers. 
Since his intellectual break from Althusser, Rancière strived to diminish the alleged 
importance of philosophers’ theories, dating as far back as Plato, and to reassert the 
importance of the human subject.11 Peter Hallward writes, “Rancière prescribes the 
primacy and equality of subjective experience as the unconditional point of departure for 
philosophy.”12 Though adopting this focus is somewhat common among the generation of 
French philosophers to which he belongs, and he has cited Foucault as being his biggest 
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influencer, Rancière has articulated that he is specifically motivated to show just how he 
departs from French contemporaries in structuralism and post-structuralism.13 Among the 
differences between Rancière and his poststructuralist contemporaries, Hallward notes, is 
the fact that Rancière refuses to “absolutize the subject,” whereby one makes subjectivity 
the ground of everything else.14 The equality of subjectivity that Hallward highlights does 
not have an ontological status nor essential, material characteristics for Rancière, because it 
is based on an assumption. As such, rather than subjectivity being foundational for 
Rancière, it figures into what I would deem an ethical orientation, wherein one assumes 
equality across the board.  
A central distinction informing Rancière’s works is between what he calls the 
police (or the police order), and politics.15 The police, also referred to as the 
partition/distribution of the sensible, can be seen as the sanctioning of roles and relations in 
society, wherein everything has a place – the absence of void.16 The sensible is just that 
which is deemed as visible, recognizable, hearable, and having a place.17 Rancière writes: 
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The police is thus first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of 
doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned 
by name to a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable 
that sees that a particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is 
understood as discourse and another as noise. 18 
 
Rancière’s works that focus on politics exclusively address the reasons why, contrary to 
there ever being ‘democratic institutions,’ all institutions are part of this police order, since 
they stipulate the names and places for those functioning within the institution(s).19 
Institutions are characterized by protocols, policies, organizational roles, strategic visions, 
and so on. Schools are a primary example of these problematic yet inevitable social 
institutions.20 
Rancière holds that schools attempt (not necessarily intentionally) to justify the 
police order by explaining that we deserve to be in the places we find ourselves because we 
have merited our roles through demonstration of our intelligence (or lack thereof) in 
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schools. The existence of schools thus contributes to what Rancière calls the 
pedagogization of society, wherein social sorting and ranking is determined and explained 
by merit that is allegedly assessed within schools, and measured by a measurer.21 When 
this sorting by capacity fails, and Rancière insists that it always does, we attempt to make 
schools more ‘inclusive’ because education is taken to be the primary mechanism by which 
we can fit people into their proper places, or into the distribution of the sensible/police 
order.22 This ‘proper placement,’ where everything is in its right place, is a societal 
harmony in which there are no outliers. This is a vision of a just society, like that described 
in Plato’s Republic, which Rancière readily critiques. Ultimately, Rancière challenges the 
aim, which some philosophers of education might have, of schools contributing to a more 
harmonious society – not because there is fault in the desire for harmony, but because it is 
a futile goal.23  
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Political moments occur when there is a redistribution or reconfiguration of socially 
accepted time and space.24 According to Rancière, we ought not to feel defined by the 
police order and the idea that there are right and wrong ways for social space to be 
navigated (i.e. correct attribution of values, correct names and interpretations, accurate 
measures, etc.). He argues that everyone is equally separated by distance (we are all, as 
speaking beings, ‘other than ourselves’), and that the quality of this distance is not 
predetermined.25 This should not be misinterpreted as meaning, however, that knowledge 
is relativistic. It is rather, as Caroline Pelletier puts it, a “defense of the possibility of 
politics.”26 Rancière’s works have indeed inspired and enriched reflection on possibility 
within education – on what it might mean to open up a space that has no predetermined 
ends, that has no set means of assessment.27  
Each person represents possibility for Rancière because when two or more people 
are in communication, the issue of the social arises: there will be something left out in 
communication, there will be disagreement, because there is no way for everything to be 
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explained, demonstrated, or understood. It would seem that possibility is an important 
element for CPI and Rancière, regardless of where CPI is implemented. So where does 
possibility fit into the overall trajectory of this project? I draw attention to this thread 
within both bodies of literature as a way to frame the response to the overall question of 
this dissertation, regarding whether philosophy is possible in schools. Indeed, it seems that 
this positive notion of philosophy for Rancière is quite analogous to the notion assumed in 
CPI. 
It is likely that if one is familiar with and sympathetic to Rancière’s works, so 
heavy with critiques of philosophy, one is also weary of explanations themselves and is not 
jumping at the chance to pigeon-hole ideas nor rigidify practices. Nonetheless, within 
Ranciere’s works and interviews there are glimmers of demanding and radical accounts of 
Rancière’s ideal philosophy. There are a small number of places where Rancière offers 
positive descriptions of philosophy, and yet a smaller number of places in the secondary 
literature where these positive descriptions are investigated. These positive instances of 
what philosophy is or can be are, in my view, worthy of consideration in light of the 
movement to bring philosophy into K-12 U.S. schools.  
Given that much work has been done to show how we can bring other concepts of 
his into schools, formulating a Rancièrean notion of philosophy may be particularly 
interesting and useful for those who are part of the movement to bring philosophy itself 
into schools. On the face of it, this is not an easy project, however. Rancière writes: 
My practice of philosophy goes along with my idea of politics. It is anarchical, in 
the sense that it traces back the specificity of disciplines and discursive 
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competences to the ‘egalitarian’ level of linguistic competence and poetic 
invention. This practice implies that I take philosophy as a specific battlefield.28 
 
Rancière depicts this as a battlefield because philosophy entails a continuous project of 
staking claims, building arguments only for them to be taken apart, parsing ideas up into 
concepts only to be disputed, and so on. This practice need not be viewed as properly 
implemented only by those with special training, those who have ‘superior’ knowledge to 
those with ‘inferior’ knowledge. As speakers, as participants in shared language, as 
communicating beings with the capacity to express unique perspectives, every person can 
participate in philosophy.29  
The suggestion that philosophy is a battlefield may strike some as quite challenging 
and is certainly provocative, particularly when applying this notion to the practice of 
philosophy in schools. A school, and much less a classroom, is not typically thought of as a 
battlefield. What I take to be meaningful about this provocation is that it helps to 
illuminate features relevant to conversations about bringing philosophy into schools: what 
is philosophy? What is a school and what should it be? Further, what is at stake in the ways 
in which we define philosophy in schools? For example, there is a lot of debate about what 
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constitutes critical thinking – whether such a thing exists, or whether it is just pretension. 
Much of the debate about whether philosophy is something unique is predicated on 
conceptions of better kinds of thinking, debates about the purpose of reason, etc. To think 
of philosophy as a battlefield means that there is something at stake in this debate, that 
there are competing sides that can bring their grievances to bear on philosophies fertile 
soil. Rancière’s positive depictions of philosophy align with much of those taken up in CPI 
literature, and it is my hope that this project can show this in order to shed light on both the 




In Chapter Two I introduce the reader to Rancière’s conceptual framework with 
regards to schooling, specifically his critiques and alternative values. I rely on secondary 
literature throughout the chapter, citing the many authors who have also drawn out various 
concepts within Rancière’s works. I highlight key concepts that I have drawn out of his 
works and that are featured throughout the dissertation: Rancière’s critiques of inequality, 
stultification, truth, explanation, progress, and the police order, and his alternatives to 
these, which are the assumption of equality of intelligence, a belief in the separation 
between language and truth, and the value of dissensus.  
In Chapter Three I introduce the reader to the conceptual framework of Rancière 
with respect to his attitude toward philosophy – his critiques as well as what I consider his 
positive thread of philosophy. I summarize the way Rancière and philosophy is normally 
discussed in the secondary literature, and show that the positive thread can be teased out so 
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that it can be applied. In the spirit of Chapter Two, this chapter draws out concepts. In the 
section outlining his critique of philosophy I include his critiques of elitism, method, and 
truth. In the section on this positive conception of philosophy I describe the norms that I 
argue he offers as a response: egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity or sitelessness. I 
show that dissensus, insofar as it entails these other components, can be a term used to 
refer generally to his positive conception of philosophy. 
Chapter Four brings together the two previous chapters by arguing that there is 
conceptual overlap between Rancière and CPI. I begin by describing the practice of CPI, 
then address some of its founding assumptions, first pertaining to schooling and then to 
philosophy. The practice of CPI takes issue with traditional schooling to the extent that the 
latter maintains inequality through stultification, assumes objective truth that requires 
explanation, and is wed to progress and the police order. CPI objects to traditional 
philosophy to the extent that the latter is elitist, assumes a method that alienates lived 
experiences, and is predicated on a notion of objective Truth accessible through reason. I 
argue that, just as with Rancière’s norms, CPI entails alternatives to the above problems in 
the following ways: it assumes equality of intelligence, believes in the separation between 
language and truth, and values egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity. 
In Chapter Five I consider the question of the possibility of philosophy in schools. I 
argue that when merely bringing the practice to traditional schools, we are required to 
replicate some of the very practices we want to avoid. However, I show that there are 
issues with using CPI to create schools based wholly on philosophy as well. I hope to show 
that despite these drawbacks, there are still good reasons to try both approaches. Ultimately 
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I argue that there are more than just practical considerations when contemplating whether 
it is possible to authentically implement the values behind CPI: I look at the way in which 
the notion of possibility underlies both approaches to CPI in/as schools, and the way that 
Rancière responds to this notion.  
The concluding chapter of the dissertation, Chapter Six, starts by offering a short 
story to refresh the reader as to the significance of this project. I offer a reflection on the 
process of writing this dissertation, followed by a suggestion of some potential next steps 




                                                     




RANCIÈRE ON SCHOOLING 
 
This chapter introduces Jacques Rancière's critique and alternative vision of 
schooling. Rancière himself avoids offering definitions, so I am taking some liberties by 
venturing down this road.31 In the first section, “Rancière’s Critique of Schooling,” I 
characterize the view by outlining his treatment of inequality, stultification, truth, 
explanation, progress, and the police order. In the second section, “Rancière’s Alternative 
Approach to Schooling,” I address his arguments for the assumption of equality of 
intelligence, the separation between language and truth, and the value of dissensus. 
Ultimately, this chapter problematizes schooling by critiquing its aims and assumptions.  
 
Rancière’s Critique of Schooling 
There are many overlaps and few clear distinctions between the terms and lines of 
argumentation that comprise Rancière’s critique, so finding a perfect way in which to 
present them is a challenge. Roughly, my intention in this section is to share the critiques 
in such a way that I strengthen the force of the section that follows, “Rancière’s Positive 
Conception of Schooling,” wherein I share what I have gleaned as his alternative to these 
problems inherent to schooling. As such, to disclose Rancière’s problematization of 
schooling, I first cover his critiques of inequality and stultification, which are in contrast to 
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his norm of equality of intelligence. Secondly, I outline his critique of explanation and 
truth, which contrast with his belief in the separation between language and truth. Lastly, I 
offer his critique of progress, which contrasts with the value of dissensus. It will be 
obvious that there is overlap between these concepts (for example, the notion of progress 
entails a conception of truth and requires explanation). Again, the reason for separating 
these terms is to help allow for the connections between principles informing both 
Rancière and CPI to be more apparent. In order to foreground each of his critiques, let me 
take a moment to illustrate the traditional view of schooling Rancière has in mind when he 
wages these critiques. 
 
Context: Traditional Schooling 
To put it simply, Rancière views schooling as a compulsory educational system, 
wherein the compulsory structure itself betrays a host of commitments (economic, 
political, etc.) and assumptions (regarding the purpose of education, etc.) that dictate and 
frame the school itself. As such, Rancière’s whole attitude toward schooling must be 
understood in terms of his attitude toward social institutions in general—in other words his 
conception of the police order, which I described in the previous chapter. Rancière is 
critical of all social institutions and writes primarily on politics and aesthetics – politics 
because he scorns attempts to create social harmony through inherently unequal social 
institutions, and aesthetics because it offers glimpses of the underlying, inherent equality 
pervading the human world and our perceptions and expressions. In describing the 
“intimate link” between politics and aesthetics so evident in his works, Tyson Lewis 
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explains that for Rancière, “aesthetics blur boundaries between what can and cannot be 
said, can and cannot be seen, thus expanding, reconfiguring, hybridizing/mixing notions of 
what is common to a community.”32 We all perceive and interpret the world separately; we 
see the color red and react to unfamiliar cultural practices in disparate ways. Language 
comes into play when we develop concepts, and this is how we engage in a shared world 
that can be changed according to our interpretation of our experiences. Rancière argues 
that insofar as schools are alleged to mitigate inequality, they do so under the assumption 
that they are able to discern the proper placement of individuals in society, and the proper 
allocation of resources in that society. In this way, social institutions such as schools 
reinforce and standardize the police order. Rancière gives some attention to schooling 
because, he argues, “school and society symbolize each other without end,” insofar as 
schools are meant to administer or even elicit the knowledge necessary for our society to 
‘progress.’33 The criticism of schools and their practices that Rancière offers thus has less 
to do with the effectiveness of certain pedagogies and more with the overarching social and 
political function that schools themselves serve.34 
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Even if a school has some different goal, such as ‘fostering independent thinking,’ 
or ‘going back to the basics,’ the context makes it such that these are still social institutions 
set on making things right. One might ask, “What is so wrong with trying to make things 
right with a school? Perhaps an ideal school would help students explore and innovate, 
challenging injustices in their communities and truly reaching their potential. Would such a 
school then be wrong in trying to make things right?” Rancière is not so extreme as to 
insist that educators or citizens give up such goals. Rancière’s predominantly negative 
depiction of schooling ought not be taken as a dictum to breed autodidactic recluses, but 
instead, to constantly be vigilant of our attitudes toward schools and our projects within 
them. Rancière says of his critiques of schooling that they create: 
a dissonance one must, in a way, forget in order to continue improving schools, 
programs and pedagogies, but that one must also, from time to time, listen to again 
so that the act of teaching does not lose sight of the paradoxes that give it 
meaning.35  
 
As Pelletier puts it, Rancière is advocating for a practice rather than a state.36 His critiques 
are thus of the type that should inform our lived attitudes; we ought not treat Rancière’s 
critiques as encompassing a final and complete justification for abandoning schools. 
According to Rancière, as we accept that schools and all social institutions are inherently 
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fraught with a kind of homogenizing limitation of perspectives and concepts, we must also 
accept that positive moments or experiences can transpire anywhere in spite of these 
problems. Having given a general gloss on his stance on schooling and the type of 
schooling with which he is concerned, I will now cover the first of the specific critiques in 
this chapter. 
 
Inequality and Stultification 
A major concept in Rancière’s oeuvre is inequality, as he is generally critical of 
efforts to create equality through social institutions, schools among them. Rancière situates 
himself in conversations regarding equality and takes steps to show the error in having any 
faith that schools can achieve equality. With his background in Marxist thought, it is 
understandable that he would have an interest in equality, since communism is generally 
predicated on the idea that society should strive for equality. Applied to schooling, 
Ranciere’s orientation can be understood as a kind of response to the notion popularly held 
by educators and put famously by Horace Mann, that education can be “the great 
equalizer.”37 
Rancière is not wholly unique in this aspect of his critique. Charles Bingham states 
in his concise commentary that Rancière overtly shares with critical and progressive 
philosophers of education a criticism of traditionalism’s past-oriented epistemology, rigid 
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conception of authority, and spectatorship on the part of the student.38 Rancière strays from 
them, however, for he argues that even those thinkers who are weary of traditional 
hierarchical models within the student-teacher relationship often still assume that schools 
are places where social inequalities can and should be solved, and neglect to question 
either the existence of the teacher, of teaching itself, or the commonly held notions of truth, 
certain virtues, etc.39 While Rancière acknowledges that social inequities are often 
reproduced through schooling, just as has been argued by Pierre Bourdeiu and Jean-Claude 
Passeron, among others, he parts ways with those who still place faith in schools to 
somehow remedy this problem.40  
Rancière argues that equality cannot be mediated and that even a ‘better’ school 
does not amount to equality among students nor between schools.41 For example, the 
educational policy No Child Left Behind supposes that educators and policy makers can 
help every student and bring specific groups up to proficiency according to federally 
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determined standards. While this is a noble initiative, it does assume that there can 
eventually be a kind of equality, even if it is just at the ‘proficient’ level in reading per age 
group, for instance. For Rancière, the very act of determining proficiency is “stultifying” 
rather than emancipatory. Stultification occurs when it is assumed that knowledge is 
transmitted directly from teacher to student, and when a student believes herself to be 
inferior to her teacher on account of this disparity of knowledge.42 The very idea that 
knowledge is a good that is allegedly distributed in schools – no less, ‘equally’ distributed 
– assumes a dichotomy or distance between knowledge and ignorance, and relies on the 
state and authority figures to regulate this ‘equality of knowledge distribution.’ Rancière 
holds thus that the school is the body that mediates the distance between inequality and 
future equality, thus postponing its realization.43  
 
Explanation and Truth 
Explanatory logic – or the grammar of schooling, as some researchers have called it 
– is the mechanism, according to Rancière, both by which the social order is explained, 
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and upon which the social order necessarily depends.44 Within the explanatory structure of 
the school it is the explicator, or teacher, who is presumed, via the ‘myth of pedagogy’, to 
lead the student from ignorance to knowledge, thereby assisting in the larger project of 
allegedly equalizing society and making democracy possible through this schooling.45 
Rancière critiques the assumption that the teacher is more intelligent than the student, and 
insists that the roles within the ‘logic of the spectator,’ wherein the student simply watches 
the teacher, can always be reversed.46 It is the act of being a “master-explicator” that one 
should avoid if one is to follow Rancière’s directives, for it is the act of explaining that 
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presupposes ignorance.47 Indeed, one should avoid wholeheartedly believing that this 
‘myth of schooling’ maps on to reality – that those with certain rankings or pieces of 
knowledge are somehow more deserving of care, social benefits, etc. A person should not 
expect nor depend on others to explain their worth to them. 
Rancière’s critique may be akin to an argument about paradigms or cultural 
practices, wherein sets of beliefs, foundational texts, historical narratives, or languages are 
recognized as contingent as opposed to necessary. Rancière is bringing to the foreground 
the tendency in Western academia (and he traces this back to ancient Greek philosophy) to 
portray schooling – from preschool to post-graduate studies – as objective and immune 
from the biases or tunnel vision often attributed to religious sects, conservative or radical 
political parties, pre-technological civilizations and the like. While it would be one thing 
for schooling to exist as its own project concerned with its own acquisition of truth or with 
its own skill-building, it is another to have a connection between this schooling and the 
distribution of roles within society.  
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As I indicated previously, Rancière is not so extreme that he is advocating for a 
complete overhaul of schooling. He is not suggesting that mere vocational training should 
replace what we have now, or that schools should all be privatized so that there is less 
danger of widespread dogma. Each of these alternatives would come with its own 
problems that would still be reflections of the already present inequalities within our 
society. Rancière is on the side of the people, as is common for those in favor of public 
education, and he is arguably interested in helping students flourish despite their 
socioeconomic backgrounds. What he is problematizing is an unquestioned faith that 
schools can achieve all of this. Even though he may not be in the business of making 
blueprints for schools supporting social mobility (much less any kind of school), 
Rancière’s critique of the limitations of schooling may lead us to think of emancipation as 
something that can occur regardless of one’s place in life, and regardless of the results of 
your evaluation within schools. In other words, social mobility as a goal should be 
scrutinized, but the notion of becoming ones best self – granting this does not impinge on 
others – could still be seen as a good in Rancière’s system. Self-improvement, however, is 
a perfect example of the way in which Rancière warns against fixation on Truth. There are 
some ways in which truth is not objective or universal – knowing what one is capable of, 
what it means to be putting in individual effort, etc. When truth is prized in schooling as 
something that can be acquired and that teachers and administrators can assess your 
knowledge of, problems of inequality arise. What should be avoided is the process of 
stultification, wherein an individual is made to feel inferior or incapable due to the fact that 
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Throughout his political works Rancière critiques the notion of progress, and 
schools are an iconic example of how progress features in society. The notion of progress 
presupposes some kind of end in which there is harmony, or a consensus within a group of 
people (be it based on scientific knowledge in a scientific community, justice within a 
society, identity through signifiers, etc.).48 In order for progress to be made there needs to 
be some gradation of value wherein the future so to speak is qualitatively better than the 
present. Rancière writes that “progress is the pedagogical fiction built into the fiction of the 
society as a whole,” and that “never will the student catch up with the master.”49 Rancière 
insists that even the progressivist teacher is still focused on growth for each student and 
has, as Cornelissen explains, a “permanent focus on the measurement of each student’s 
individual learning needs.”50 The pedagogy of progress perpetuates a vertical hierarchy 
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between those who are on a lower rung or stage of intelligence and/or emancipation, and 
those ‘progressive pedagogues,’ by promising a future realization of equality, all under the 
pretense that there is some reason that those on the lower rung are dependent on those on 
the higher rungs for this help.51 According to this critique, measurement of growth in 
schools simply serves as an explanation of difference and reinstatement of inequality – 
between student and teacher, teacher and administrator, etc. – not actual measurement of 
intelligence nor growth along a path toward knowledge.52 It is not that hard work or 
usefulness of research, skill sets, or experience ought to be devalued, but that we ought not 
entrench all of society’s goals and values into one story, one roadmap of knowledge 
acquisition, with one select rank of people who are allowed to measure progress along such 
a map.  
On this path, there are truth conditions assumed by anyone doing the measuring, 
whether consciously or not: the teacher/explicator (or measurer) has truth and the student 
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(or measured) does not.53 The notion of progress is thus predicated on a transcendent 
notion of truth, wherein the truth, or the good, is somehow outside – a conception of truth 
to which Rancière is adamantly opposed.54 It is not so much that Rancière is objecting to 
there being objective facts (e.g. water can exist in multiple states – gas, liquid, solid) or to 
there being steps toward learning things (e.g. numeration before counting). However, for 
Rancière’s critiques to benefit people in the egalitarian sense that he intends, pedagogues 
must not hold too tightly to this quest for progress. Nor ought we feel beholden to any 
value we attribute to this truth acquisition, nor any roles we assign based on such 
acquisition. If a student does not grasp chemistry or counting or civic skills, this ought not 
determine how we treat them or conceive of our relation to them; we ought not ‘defer 
equality’.55  
Rancière thus inspires a focus on the way we situate ourselves in relation to others 
in each moment, as opposed to focusing on progress and the future.56 This is easier said 
than done, because we certainly each set goals, engage in projects that take time and 
planning, and naturally think about the future. However, this can be a helpful reminder of 
an ideal that some of us may share, to live our values in each moment. In the case of 
Rancière’s insistence on assuming equality in each moment, this means that pedagogues 
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ought to recognize that each person, whether teacher or student, is similar insofar as they 
have their own individual will and participate in a shared world of concepts, language, 
customs, and so on.  
In this section I began with our common or ordinary understanding of how the 
school is meant to help ‘right’ society.  Next, I outlined Rancière’s critiques of inequality 
and stultification, explanation and truth, and progress. It should be evident that the burden 
falls on Rancière to indicate what good can come of schooling. In the section that follows, 
I move to assist Rancière in this endeavor. 
 
Rancière’s Alternative Approach to Schooling 
Comprising an alternative to the values, assumptions, and negative patterns central 
to Rancière’s critique of schooling covered above, this section outlines norms that can be 
drawn from Rancière’s works. To be clear, I use the word norm loosely because Rancière 
does not offer prescriptive recommendations and is indeed opposed to recommendations 
given the inherent risk of dogmatism. Again, my interest is in applying various aspects of 
Rancière’s conceptual framework to thinking through philosophy in schools; I am not 
intending to be entirely faithful to Rancière. Among these norms pertinent to schooling 
that I have mind, which contrast with the critiques outlined in the previous section, are the 
belief in a separation between language and truth, the assumption of equality of 
intelligence, and the valuing of dissensus. Before elucidating these norms, it is worthwhile 




Context: The Ignorant Schoolmaster 
In Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual 
Emancipation, as well as in several other essays, Rancière describes Joseph Jacotot, a 
nineteenth century French schoolteacher who engaged in no direct instruction yet had 
students who learned, insofar as they were able to learn French by referring only to a 
bilingual French/Flemish copy of the Telemaque. The students were able to describe in 
French what they were reading, after many repetitions of reciting the text. Jacotot had an 
interpreter give the instructions to the students and then encouraged the students as they 
recited the text in French. The takeaway from this, in Ranciere’s view, is that a teacher can 
“teach” what he or she does not know. Rancière uses this figure to exemplify “the ignorant 
schoolmaster,” who embodies certain norms.  
The ignorant schoolmaster, who is also said to be engaged in what Rancière refers 
to as universal teaching, allows for her students to experience emancipation, which occurs 
through subjectivization. The ignorant schoolmaster is not needed for subjectivization and 
emancipation, but if a teacher does not embody the attitude of an ignorant schoolmaster, 
they will do nothing but impede or overlook emancipation when it occurs. Rancière 
discusses emancipation and subjectivization in contexts other than in schooling – in art and 
in real politics, for example. When it comes to his limited works on schooling, however, 
the ignorant schoolmaster always figures as a kind of ideal. By describing the belief in a 
separation between language and truth, the assumption of equality of intelligence, and the 
valuing of dissensus, this section should make the meaning of the resulting emancipation 
32 
 
via subjectivization in the context of schooling clear. We can now begin the journey, and 
perhaps (to Rancière’s dismay) make progress.  
 
 
Separation between Language and Truth 
Rancière asserts that the most important virtue a schoolmaster can have is that of 
ignorance.57 Now, is Rancière suggesting that teachers should withhold their knowledge 
from students?58 Rancière writes that the ignorant schoolmaster need not be ignorant, but 
should: 
disassociate his knowledge from his mastery. He does not teach his knowledge to 
his students. He commands them to venture forth in the forest, to report what they 
see, what they think of what they have seen, to verify it, and so on. What he ignores 
is the gap between two intelligences.59  
 
Content here it not as important as the relationship that the teacher has to the student. To 
put this in my own language, even if the instructor knows some content, the goal is to be 
ignorant of the disparity between his knowledge and his student’s knowledge – to protect 
against the tendency to inflate one’s ego, propagate a superiority complex, and treat the 
student with judgment. Thus, it is an intentional disruption of the social hierarchy that may 
form when/if one assumes that teachers have power (or the ability to influence social 
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change) because they are more intelligent or are destined for their social roles because they 
possess something students and others do not.60 Ultimately the ignorant schoolmaster must 
dissociate her mastery from her knowledge, recognizing that her mastery – as in, her role 
as a “master,” not her mastery of a subject or skill – and her knowledge are not linked in 
essence.61 Just because she is a teacher, it does not mean that she is inherently more 
intelligent, let alone more valuable, than her student. This refusal to stake a claim on the 
essence of social roles and power, this refusal to affirm that there is something essentially 
true is but a symptom of Rancière’s whole approach to truth: truth simply is not something 
that language (i.e. society) can represent. 
As Charles Bingham and Gert Biesta describe it, Rancière relies on an 
“emancipatory logic” which is agnostic about truth, holding that truth is immanent to 
education, rather than something that exists out there in the world that some of us can 
apprehend.62 Rancière maintains that although the idea of truth may well be something 
meaningful, it is not something that can be explained: democratic acts, or demonstrations 
of equality, are not phenomena that can fit into a coherent logic, be represented, nor given 
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a name.63 The problems inherent in setting up a dichotomy between those who allegedly 
have the truth (teachers) and those who do not (students) can be avoided or at least 
dampened by simply being agnostic about truth. This requires that one disassociate the 
notion of truth from speech utterances, and acknowledge that the police order is not 
comprehensive nor definitive, but rather is quite arbitrary and malleable.64 Indeed, 
Rancière’s ideal, emancipatory pedagogue practices “a more general, active form of 
ignorance: an ignoring of truth.”65 As Biesta puts it, such a teacher is not ‘ignorant’ 
because he or she “lacks knowledge, but because knowledge is not the ‘way’ of 
emancipation.”66 It thus becomes less important for a teacher to lecture and explain truths.  
The kind of truth that enables one to be emancipated, to truly act in accordance 
with freedom – the very thing that (arguably) allows us to be moral agents, feel happiness, 
etc. – is the kind of truth that cannot be verified, cannot be known empirically. We are still 
beings that live in relation to one another; this should not be understood as a 
recommendation for solipsism. However, this is a recommendation that we distinguish 
between the faults of socially constructed knowledge and any immanent truths that we may 
have access to on a more primordial level. 
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As Pelletier puts it, the epistemological assumption informing Rancière’s work is 
that knowledge is a practice of recognition within communities. She writes that knowledge 
in The Ignorant Schoolmaster is “a position within an evolving set of relations, a move 
which focuses analysis on the principles by which knowledge is recognized within a 
collectivity, rather than on whether knowledge is possessed.”67 Knowledge is not 
something that is done to anyone. Instead, knowledge and truth in Rancière’s world are 
done by people, characterized by horizontal rather than hierarchical moves, revealing that 
existing links between power (claims to authority) and knowledge do not map on to any 
essential differences among people, but are instead historically contingent and arbitrary.68 
Using the new “emancipatory logic” Rancière inspires, one trusts the experiences of 
students because there is not a belief that truth is only accessible to some.69  
Rancière criticizes the notion of progress and highlights the gap entailed in any 
model of growth (you must be separate from X to be able to one day attain X). This gap 
itself becomes positive when Rancière examines it. The distance between any subject (be 
they teacher or student) and object (‘knowledge’ in this case) is precisely the space that 
provides room for emancipation.70 If we recognize, for example, that what we call “purple” 
is contingent on our personal sensory experience, then we can recognize that the 
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contingency exists on many different planes, among people, between experiences and 
concepts. When we recognize that we are each always engaged in some form of this, of 
attempting to bridge a gap between our inner experiences and our shared world, we can 
recognize a kind of equality there. We can recognize that apparent differences are still all 
hinging on what we label things, how we perceive them, and assumptions about what our 
shared world(s) consists of. That distance between the way the world is (or how we each 
perceive it) and the way that we name it, discuss it, and value it, makes all the difference. 
Recognizing this distance can result in a feeling of humility or superiority (Rancière is 
obviously advocating for the former). Ignoring the distance altogether certainly can amount 
to a dogmatic perspective in life. 
 
The Assumption of Equality of Intelligence 
The assumption of equality of intelligence for Rancière is related to his recognition 
of the separation between truth and language, because it is all about the way in which we 
each are equally separated by distance. This norm indeed acknowledges the larger societal 
impacts that arise when we disregard this equality, serving as a response to the critique of 
inequality outlined in the previous section. We all start out as equal insofar as we are 
conscious players in the world, surviving as we do, but then we take on social roles or 
functions and pretend that they are predicated on something essential, which we know we 
cannot access or at least not put into words. Some people are more intelligent than others, 
and thus more deserving of wealth or power, the story would go. To be ignorant of 
inequality is to see past these social roles and stories.  When an ignorant schoolmaster 
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embodies an ignorance of inequality, this precludes the signification of an objective ‘end’ 
of knowledge by which the teacher might judge her students.71 It is not just ignorance of 
inequality that the ignorant schoolmaster upholds, but ignorance with respect to epistemic 
certainty and her role as a teacher, and indeed, the alleged roles that his or her students are 
allegedly destined for. To put it simply, claims to knowledge, as well as ignorance, have 
social impacts for Rancière, and we ought to be vigilant about these impacts. 
It may seem at this point that the proposition is somewhat naïve or simply wrong. 
There is a clear difference between the amount of effort some people will put forth in order 
to achieve certain levels of social success, and it would be absurd to instead pretend that 
everyone is equal. For example, some people will work several jobs to make ends meet and 
obtain a better quality of life, while others who already have that same quality of life 
(maybe they were born into a family that provided it) put forth minimal effort to maintain 
that experience given their life circumstances and/or demographic reality. Rancière is not 
asking for us to ignore that there are differences like this. The assumption of equality of 
intelligence is a direct response to the aim in schooling to achieve equality. This aim of 
reaching equality, Rancière argues, actually presupposes inequality and is premised on the 
aforementioned problems of the police order and progress.  
What is needed for Rancière is an ignorant schoolmaster who can assume equality 
and guide her students with her will through the space of possibility in which ruptures of 
new and unforeseen meaning can erupt in any direction – rather than to a set end.72 This 
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way of viewing equality is different from the typical way it is framed, which is why it is 
coined ‘radical equality.’73 The assumption that all are of equal intelligence is an axiom or 
hypothesis from which we act, not an ending place nor fact to prove; it is in principle not 
limited by expectations or assessments, and is an assumption we must return to 
constantly.74 Rancière encourages educators to look more deeply into this tendency to 
judge students to be unintelligent for various reasons.  
Rancière writes, “the equality of intelligence is not the equality of all 
manifestations of intelligence. It is the equality of intelligence in all its manifestations.”75 
This apparent play on words is profound, in my reading, for it is asserting that there is one 
intelligence that is showing itself in different ways, as opposed to intelligence having many 
different forms. It is akin to saying that “we are all one person” as opposed to “we are all 
people.” If you take this too literally, you might think that there is just some kind of 
mistake. Granted, we are all separate people and we are not one person. Rancière is 
concerned about the impacts of supposing things, though. Suppose that we are all one 
person, despite the different ways we look, our different perspectives, behaviors, desires, 
and so on. If we suppose we are still one person despite the apparent differences, we 
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automatically have more patience for trying to understand others. To me, this is the impact 
of suggesting that there is only one intelligence manifesting in different ways.  
Naturally, this implies that one cannot form judgments about different kinds of 
intelligence.76 If one states that there are different manifestations of intelligence without 
referring to a singular intelligence, then it is much more natural to develop a ranking and 
classification system. As an egalitarian, Rancière is working to avoid such rankings. Thus, 
the notion of a singular intelligence plays an important role in thinking through 
egalitarianism in education. Viewing intelligence as collective, singular, emergent 
phenomena – rather than varied along a linear path and thus admitting of comparison of 
different manifestations of it – frees us from the tendency to try to assess different abilities 
and use them to explain power disparities.77 Again, this should not all be taken as a 
directive to completely stop what we are doing in schools (introducing students to skills, 
equipping students with resources to specialize in careers of their choosing, and so on), but 
should inspire us to consider our assumptions in schools. 
 Additionally, conceiving of intelligence as singular should not be conflated with a 
conception of any kind of singular material force (be it political or otherwise physical in 
any way), for Rancière explains that this common power of intelligence “binds individuals 
together to the very extent that it keeps them apart from each other; it is the power each of 
us possesses in equal measure to make our own way in the world.”78 Nor should 
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conceiving of intelligence as shared and thus as a ‘unitary’ entity mislead us to think that 
consensus or totality is the goal, nor that we can realize or uncover this intelligence or 
solve ‘problems of ignorance’ with finality.79 This singular intelligence will ever be out of 
reach, evading quantification, and an appreciation for this may serve educators and 
students well in schools.80  
Intelligence is argued by Rancière to be synonymous with equality: since 
intelligence is contingent on understanding another person or being understood by another 
person, the possibility for which presupposes equal capacity for this understanding.81 
Equality of intelligence implies not only that when one uses language one is assuming that 
another person can discern one’s meaning, but also that there are no two kinds of 
intelligence – only one which is predicated on “the wish to say and the wish to hear.”82 
Rancière suggests provocatively that there is a “collective intelligence of imagination” 
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wherein there is not a goal of consensus but rather, where dissensus continually occurs, 
where forms deemed recognizable are constantly challenged.83  
 
The Value of Dissensus 
Rancière’s notion of dissensus can be understood as an alternative to the ideal of 
progress. For Rancière, real politics (not the police order) is characterized by dissensus – it 
is a “difference within the same,” and it cannot be deduced based on an alleged essence 
within a given community, nor can it be foreseen or obtain in any place but the present 
(there is no static end of emancipation).84 Dissensus is inherently anarchistic, with relations 
always able to be set up differently.85 The impetus for emancipation is the recognition that 
the will does not correspond to a cohesive whole upon which consensus can be reached. 
Therefore, there is no ordered harmony or end to which we can progress. Of course, people 
should all set goals, challenge themselves, and grow, but the catch is that there should also 
be vigilance against the habit of seeing institutions as the arbiters of such ‘progress.’ For 
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those interested in challenging the police order, there is a need to be conscious of the 
internalized metrics and their origin.  
When discussing the human will en masse, Rancière states, “a force is a force. It 
can be reasonable to make use of it. But it is irrational to want to render it reasonable,” and 
that “society as such will never be reasonable.”86 The overall picture is thus that the will, or 
the inherent, equal intelligence shared by all, does not correspond with commonly held 
notions of rational progress toward consensus nor ideal, harmonized, democratic social 
institutions. Politics and emancipation, two ideals within Rancière’s framework, occur in 
non-teleological ways, in anarchistic moments that do not conform to predictably 
discursive frameworks. This is why Alex Means explains that Rancière’s notion of 
education can be described as a question.87 Indeed, Rancière’s entire body of work rests on 
his insistence that signs – words and their stipulated meanings – do not embody an 
essential connection with their signifiers, and indeed, that we cannot speak of an essential 
quality of any phenomena (hence his adamant disavowal of ontology).88 It is easy to see 
here how this line of thinking corresponds with his belief in the separation between 
language and truth as outlined earlier. 
There can still be better schools and better police orders, for we can have better 
understandings of “how words, stories, and performances can help us change something in 
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the world we live in.”89 Carl Anders Safstrom characterizes Rancière’s critique of schools 
as exposing the ‘myth of schooling’ and suggests that Rancière’s notion of dissensus is 
what should happen in schools; we ought to have pedagogy of dissensus.90 This is not a 
specific method, but as Safstrom states, entails asking “what do you think differently,” and 
requires that we ask this “in such a way as to prevent an answer that reestablishes the 
normal circumstances for that thinking.”91 In this way, dissensus is not a technique but “the 
force through which the naturalness of orders is undone,” allowing us to challenge 
preconceived notions and social constructs through and through.92 In my view, this sounds 
just like what philosophy is – challenging all claims to knowledge, and challenging the 
very premise of a school as a place where knowledge is acquired.   
Based on what I have represented from Rancière’s works it would seem that we 
have ample reason to be uncertain about the possibility of a ‘pedagogy of dissensus’ 
actually having a positive effect, given his strong warnings against pedagogies of all kinds. 
However, there are also works of Rancière’s and interpretations of his work that give hope 
to the democratic possibilities inherent in schools, gesturing toward a positive appreciation 
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for schooling.93 My interest is to unpack the nuance of Rancière’s complaints and 
suggestions about schooling as they pertain to philosophical practice in schools, to hold on 
to this hope and skepticism while pondering the possibility of philosophy in schools. 
 
Conclusion  
For Rancière, while schools may never be emancipatory nor constitutive of 
equality, there can still be ‘better’ schools.94 He admonishes attempts to institutionalize 
equality, yet also provides glimpses of a proposed alternative logic. In his preface to 
Bingham and Biesta’s book on his educational critiques, Rancière  demonstrates this two-
part move well: 
Distinguishing the act of intellectual emancipation from the institution of the 
people’s instruction is to affirm that there are no stages to equality; that equality is 
a complete act or is not at all. There is a heavy price to pay for this escape. If 
explanation is a social method, the method by which inequality gets represented 
and reproduced, and if the institution is the place where this representation 
operates, it follows that intellectual emancipation is necessarily distinct from social 
and institutional logic. That is to say that there is no social emancipation, and no 
emancipatory school.95 
 
If institutions are needed for people to be intellectually emancipated, then they can 
obviously become the deciding factor as to whether a given person has become 
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“intellectually emancipated.” If this determination is instead in the hands of an individual, 
and every individual, then equality simply already exists, and schools (at least those whose 
premise is to contribute to equality) become invalidated. However, this also implies that 
schools literally cannot be the arbiters of intellectual emancipation. Rancière advocates for 
us to ‘pay this heavy price,’ and to strive toward emancipation for all.  
 We cannot count on any social institution to be emancipatory, but we can see it as a 
social project to constantly mistrust the notion that we have confirmation regarding truth 
and who has access to it; we can assume and ‘be of the opinion’ that all have equal 
intelligence.96 We can appreciate dissensus when it occurs, rather than striving for a final 
harmony or consensus mitigated through schools. Real inequality, in terms of access to 
resources, wealth in general, freedom from violence, etc., exists in the world. Is the root of 
this inequality knowledge/intelligence, or is it something we contribute to with our every 
assumption? 
Moving into some conjecture about what ‘better schools’ might look like for 
Rancière, it would seem from all this that having a space without ends is the best-case 
scenario for a school.97 In contrast to the common aim of putting equality as an end, 
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thereby granting that there is something to fix, perpetuating power disparities in the name 
of reaching harmonious consensus, Rancière offers equality as an initial axiom, and leaves 
aims and ends out of it.98 We might thus envision a school of possibility, where the 
potential in the present moment matters more than the outcomes. Such a school would not 
emphasize possibility simply to contrast with a school aimed toward progress, but instead 
would be one in which notions of progress are problematized. There are plenty of models 
of schools that are intentionally democratic or “free,” without curricula, grading, etc., 
though they are also available only for those who can pay or who have savvy parents; 
radical schools are not the norm for most U.S. students. Looking further into whether such 
models would be conducive to Rancièrian norms surrounding education would be an 
interesting project for the future, and I do this a bit more in Chapter Five, but my focus in 
this dissertation is to look specifically at the thread of philosophy within Rancière’s works, 
and to apply this to my investigation of one way that philosophy is practiced in U.S. K-12 
schools. If we are to operate in our current K-12 public schools geared largely toward 
outcomes, what does it really mean to be an ignorant schoolmaster who is keen on 
dissensus? Are those who do CPI on the right track? 
As this chapter has illuminated, Rancière critiques schooling yet also invokes many 
themes and concepts that may be helpful in contributing to better schools. Philosophical 
readers may have read this chapter with a keen interest in how it is that philosophy relates 
to Rancière’s critique of schooling and his more positive, alternative insights. In my view, 
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society entails schooling mechanisms by necessity – whether formally or not, even in the 
simple mechanism of a shared language – so we ought to accept this whilst also 
considering ways to respect ourselves and others. My overall aim in this dissertation is to 
inquire into how Rancière’s treatment of philosophy is particularly useful in improving 
schooling, even if the improvement is simply a dose of humility, given the inherent 
limitations of schooling. The first step, covered in this chapter, was to look at the context 
for this project: Rancière on schooling, in both his critical and positive approaches. 
Shifting the focus now, Chapter Three will investigate Rancière as his work pertains to 
philosophy itself, so that I may continue building my case for using Rancière’s approach to 









RANCIÈRE ON PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Having looked in the last chapter at Rancière’s critiques of traditional schooling as 
well as his alternative values, this chapter takes the same approach regarding his treatment 
of philosophy. This chapter takes up the question posed by Joseph Tanke, in his Jacques 
Ranciere: An Introduction: should we take Rancière’s works to be indicative of a 
“departure from philosophy as such or just philosophy as it is traditionally practiced and 
conceived?”99 In other words, might it be that we should not count Rancière as a 
philosopher, or is he introducing a different way of philosophizing?  
To answer Tanke’s question, I divide the chapter into two main sections. In the first 
section, “Rancière’s Critiques of Philosophy,” I describe Rancière’s critique of philosophy 
as it is traditionally practiced and conceived, parsing the critique into three main focal 
points: elitism, method, and truth. In the second section, “Rancière’s Positive Conception 
of Philosophy,” I describe his account of how philosophy should be practiced and 
conceived, contrasting the former three critiques with what I pick out as his alternatives: 
egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity. By putting forth these critiques and alternatives I 
show Rancière to indeed be departing from how philosophy is traditionally practiced and 
conceived, setting the reader up to see, in Chapter Four, the similarities to how community 
of philosophical inquiry (CPI) conceives of philosophy. 
                                                     




I would like to remind the reader that trying to categorize, systematize, or order any 
part of Rancière’s works, particularly in the interest of fleshing out what we might call 
positive threads within his conception, is a bit paradoxical. In the same way that explaining 
Rancière’s critique of explanation may come across as ironic, so too might it seem strange 
to argue for these kinds of actionable ideals or clear concepts. Rancière himself insists that 
he is not trying to set norms, that his practice of philosophy is admittedly “difficult,” and 
that he does not have a system.100 My project here is not wholly consistent with Rancière’s 
project. My intention is thus to allow what I appreciate from him to inform my own 
thinking about philosophy in schools.  
By way of another disclaimer, what I am calling positive may be understood as 
what I take to be Rancière’s suggestions on what he either thinks philosophy can and 
should do, or what he thinks it is when done properly. It is an ideal we might consider if 
we want to avoid reproducing the same kind of problematic behaviors or assumptions 
Rancière condemns. It can be thought of as a contrast to the negative treatment of 
philosophy in his works wherein he is critiquing the tradition or profession of philosophy. 
Rancière has been referred to as having an emancipatory philosophy, and has used this 
term to describe the Jacototian pedagogy he praises in The Ignorant Schoolmaster and 
elsewhere.101 I avoid using the phrase “emancipatory philosophy” because to me it 
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connotes a structured approach, and does not fully capture the way in which Rancière 
offers only piecemeal suggestions portraying the positive thread in his conception of 
philosophy. Ultimately, I think that the connotation of “positive philosophy” is less 
problematic than the connotation of “emancipatory philosophy,” but it may in the end be a 
stylistic choice. In any case, this chapter is meant to demonstrate the appeal of looking at 
Rancière’s quite loosely termed conception of philosophy, including the critiques and 
loosely termed positive threads, so that we might apply this to schooling, given what we 
know of his critiques and alternatives regarding schooling from the preceding chapter.  
 
Rancière’s Critiques of Philosophy 
Figuring consistently from his very first publications to his most recent, Rancière’s 
critiques of philosophy can be divided into three issues which I will address in this order: 
elitism, method, and the notion of truth. It is not my intent here to assert whether Rancière 
is correct in his critiques, it is simply to characterize his dissatisfaction with philosophy 
writ large.102 Further, I have chosen to sort and focus his work using these three terms due 
to my larger interest in comparing his conception of philosophy with that of CPI, as I will 




                                                     
102. Indeed, I would like to challenge some of his interpretations of the Platonic 





Rancière is adamantly against claims that connect philosophy with positions of 
power, whereby a person of authority claims that it is their intelligence or superior 
propensity to reason that explains their social function. Accordingly, he does not endorse 
the arguments that professional academic philosophers are the only people who can or 
should think philosophically. He voices this concern with what are referred to as 
“intellectuals” in an interview: “what is at issue is the idea of a specific class of 
intelligence that has a role by virtue of its superior capacity.”103 He pins the source of this 
kind of intellectual elitism on the tradition of philosophy popularized by Plato, arguing in 
The Philosopher and His Poor that Plato’s Republic is largely meant simply to ensure that 
philosophers are viewed as inherently, uniquely elite as compared to other types of people: 
Philosophy cannot simply justify itself as a post within the division of labor; if it 
did so, it would fall back into the democracy of the trades. Hence it must 
exacerbate the argument from nature, giving it the shape of a prohibition marked on 
bodies (…) There simply are bodies that cannot accommodate philosophy – bodies 
marked and stigmatized by the servitude of the work for which they have been 
made.104  
 
It is argued in the Republic that philosophers are able to discern fundamental principles, 
harmonize their souls, and live more virtuously than those who do not practice philosophy, 
based on an alleged propensity built into the nature of certain individuals. Rancière takes 
issue with the implicit elitism in this argument. While this elitism might play out in 
arguments or assumptions about capacity, it also manifests in arguments related to 
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circumstance. We can easily see these in operation if we imagine an argument that children 
cannot philosophize, or an argument that real philosophy only takes place in certain kinds 
of departments (those that require a logic course of their undergraduates, for example). 
While there is nothing wrong with setting up criteria, the point here is to look at the social 
consequence of defending certain criteria. 
Nick Hewlett argues that Rancière’s critique of philosophy shows us “it was 
established philosophy and sociology that were intrinsically elitist.”105 So it may not be the 
act of philosophizing or even reasoning that is under attack here, but the association of that 
act with social roles (i.e. professors of philosophy). Indeed, Rancière writes, when 
speaking of intellectuals, “the very idea of a class in society whose specific role is to think 
is preposterous and can be conceived only because we live under a preposterous social 
order.”106 The critique is aimed at the suggestion that some people should not philosophize, 
and that being thoughtful about our actions is a task that can and should be delegated to 
only some individuals for the sake of economic efficiency.  
Rancière’s critique of the field of philosophy as a discipline challenges those in the 
‘ivory tower’ to question their implicit or overt claims to have a better understanding of 
things, via philosophical reasoning, than do those in other professions.107 Again, his 
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critique of philosophy, as with his critique of schooling, should be understood in terms of 
his attitude toward social institutions in general. Hallward writes that: 
According to Rancière, philosophy per se begins by trying to distinguish people 
capable of genuine thought from others who, entirely defined by their social or 
economic occupation, are presumed to lack the ability, time and leisure required for 
thought.108 
 
Hallward is referring to Rancière’s critique of the Philosopher King model, which he reads 
quite literally in Plato, and which he sees replicated time and again in other philosophers.  
The thread of egalitarianism that runs through Rancière’s works is in tension with 
philosophers who claim to have access to a logos, or an ability to explain the world using a 
special formula (reason) to which they have exclusive access (as Rancière reads Plato to 
have done). As such, we must understand the second primary critique of philosophy as a 
critique of method – investigated in what follows.  
 
Method 
One might ask whether Rancière is taking issue with the notion of reason or logos 
as an underlying order, or with the alleged exclusive possession of this reason. Does 
Rancière have a problem with the idea that there might be a reasonable order to everything, 
underlying appearances in the way logos is represented in some Platonic dialogues, or does 
he have a problem with the idea, as presented in the Republic, that it is philosophers in 
particular who can really know and understand this reasonable order? To put the question 
                                                     




another way: is Rancière troubled simply by the concept of the Philosopher King, or is he 
troubled by philosophy itself as presented in the Platonic dialogues?  
The method of reason is one aspect of academic philosophy that Rancière attacks 
because academic philosophers claim to have special knowledge of this method. In Plato’s 
Republic this method is presented as dialectical, wherein one works toward reaching the 
first principle of things – a more complete understanding of the form or foundation of 
everything – by looking past mere material senses. From the Republic: 
Dialectic is the only inquiry that travels this road, doing away with hypotheses and 
proceeding to the first principle itself, so as to be secure. And when the eye of the 
soul is really buried in a sort of barbaric bog, dialectic gently pulls it out and leads 
it upwards.109 
 
This method generally entails defining terms or concepts in contrast with their opposites, 
and slowly crystalizing them by way of eliminating non-essential parts. This procedure of 
coming to know things through the dialectic, which philosophers are alleged to be privy to 
in the Republic, is what Rancière seems to be concerned about with respect to method.  
It has been said of Rancière’s projects, such as his archival work on workers' 
communications, that he “calls into question the protocols and practices of both philosophy 
and historiography through his own participation in writing.”110 For example, Rancière 
warns that when people interpret The Ignorant Schoolmaster as advocating for the 
application of a method, they become rigidified and use whatever method they devise 
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dogmatically. Rancière himself insists that he has neither a philosophical nor a pedagogical 
method, and that he is not advocating for either. He insists that philosophers should never 
fall into the trap of putting a value on one discursive practice as though it were of final and 
of ultimate value, for one cannot and should not prescribe a science of emancipation. 
Rancière argues that even an abstract notion such as reason imposes something on 
the world: “there is no clear divide between theory and its practical application (…) All 
transformation interprets, and all interpretation transforms.”111 Every kind of theory we can 
construct to describe actions in the world is born out of lived experiences, and means 
something different depending on the context (one example that Rancière uses is trying to 
apply universal rules to the prohibition of Islamic headscarves, or ideals of democracy and 
freedom used to justify military invasion.)112 There is thus no practical way of isolating 
reason, nor of referring to universal concepts in order to justify actions in such a way that 
everyone would agree that one is “right.” As Hallward puts it, “it is a peculiar delusion of 
conventional philosophy, Rancière suggests, to presume that thought proceeds not only as 
a form of dis-placement but as fully independent of place.”113 So it is not only the elitism 
that comes from claims to special knowledge, but method itself that is questionable from a 
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Rancièrean perspective.114 To understand more about his concerns about elitism and 
method, let us look at what he has to say about truth with regard to philosophy.  
 
Truth 
While Rancière does not always invoke the term truth when attacking traditional 
philosophy, I am highlighting two instances where he does utilize the term.115 The first 
quote is pertaining to the hierarchy associated with claims about truth. He writes, “If there 
is a privilege of philosophy, it lies in the frankness with which it tells us that the truth 
about Truth is a fiction and undoes the hierarchy just as it builds it.”116 We can conclude 
from this that Rancière refrains from making claims focused on objective truth because he 
believes such claims to ultimately have an elitist effect. Under attack here, of course, are 
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essentially the Platonic forms, presented in the dialogues as supremely objective. Rancière 
has stated that although philosophers often make categorical and affirmative statements, he 
cannot bring himself to make such statements in earnest.117 Claims about Truth (the capital 
T represents an objective, irrefutable category) can preclude the lived experiences or 
challenges of others. Philosophy, for Rancière, allows us to always put into question these 
allegedly objective and irrefutable truths, particularly surrounding the social impacts of 
such assertions (i.e. hierarchies).  
Socrates says in the Republic that the dialectic can always bring one up and out of 
confused, muddled thoughts – an act that I take to be somewhat akin to Rancière’s claims 
about the ability of philosophy to draw new boundaries. In Plato’s picture there is a 
hierarchy whereby the dialectic allegedly allows us to draw closer to truth through repeated 
steps in inquiry. The dialectical move itself is intended to challenge assumptions from the 
outside, by questioning them, offering counterexamples, highlighting contradictions, and 
so on. Rancière’s positive iteration of philosophy entails a similar move of critiquing from 
the outside by pushing against barriers or distinctions allegedly grounded in arguments, 
and by challenging the assumptions and arbitrary distinctions on which they are based. 
However, Rancière’s movement is specifically not hierarchical and linear, nor is it based 
on an ontological conception. This orientation corresponds with his views on politics or 
democracy, where for political or democratic moments to obtain they must transpire as 
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eruptions – breaks with the order of things. Plato’s picture is known for being hierarchical 
insofar as the Form of the Good is analogous to the sun casting light on all earthly 
existence, informing its being; Truth is at the top and false beliefs are below. Rancière, by 
contrast, challenges the notion of truth in every place the word is uttered, thereby 
destabilizing a model of progress. 
This brings me to the second quote from Rancière that I would like to highlight as 
an instance of his conception of truth, this one found in The Ignorant Schoolmaster. 
Rancière writes:  
Truth doesn't bring people together at all. It is not given to us. It exists 
independently from us and does not submit to our piecemeal sentences. [...] But for 
all that, truth is not foreign to us, and we are not exiled from its country. The 
experience of veracity attaches us to its absent center; it makes us circle around its 
foyer. [...] Thus, each one of us describes our parabola around the truth. No two 
orbits are alike. [...] No one has a relationship to the truth if he is not on his own 
orbit.118 
 
Truth for Rancière is always fractured when we try to articulate it, which means that we 
appear to be in very similar position to Truth as in Plato’s system. The difference between 
Rancière’s notion of Truth and Plato’s, at least if we are on board with the common, literal 
interpretation of the dialogues that he is following, is that for Rancière we are each 
“orbiting around the truth,” thus precluding the possibility that there is one class of people 
that is closer to it.119 Furthermore, for Rancière the truth would seem internal and 
subjective rather than external, as he reads Plato’s Truth to be. 
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The issue Rancière has with the traditional philosophical notion of truth as he finds 
it in Plato, or the notion that is implied by the previously mentioned tendencies – toward 
elitism and a reification of reason – is that it assumes that there are distinct parcels of 
knowledge that can be apprehended, and that there are certain kinds of people or methods 
that can alone come close to these parcels. As Andrew Schaap asserts, Rancière “turned 
away from philosophy” because of what he felt to be its tendency either to fetishize 
concepts or to fetishize praxis, and to treat concepts and praxis as separate and distinct.120 
Rancière’s central focus, as Tanke points out, is to trace the “form philosophy assumes 
when it founds itself by partitioning the world on the basis of supposed distinct natures.”121 
Emmanuel Renault asserts that in much of his critical work, Rancière takes issue with the 
attempt in political philosophy to “realize the essence of philosophy (that is, the 
philosophical description of a social order grounded on a principle.)”122 Schapp argues that 
in Disagreement Rancière describes philosophers like Plato as feeling “scandalized” upon 
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concluding that politics is actually groundless and anarchistic; Plato’s endeavor to uncover 
the underlying order and find the right place for everything was fruitless, in Rancière’s 
view.123 However, we know that Rancière does not want to give up on the act of 
philosophizing, despite the failures of his predecessors and their unfortunate propensity to 
uphold elitist orientations toward method and truth. Therefore, let us move on to the 
positive threads within Rancière’s conception of philosophy to see where hope might be 
found. 
 
Rancière’s Positive Conception of Philosophy 
In this section I first point out several places in the secondary literature where 
Rancière’s conception of philosophy is addressed, highlighting that more work could be 
done to think through his normative or positive conception of philosophy. Next, I show 
how such a positive account would contrast with the critiques of philosophy I reviewed in 
the previous section of this chapter. To build this positive account, I first argue that 
Rancière’s alternative to the notion of truth critiqued in the previous section is creativity 
and absence of a site. Next, I describe why in contrast to method critiqued in the previous 
section, Rancière favors assertion. Finally, I suggest that in contrast to elitism, and quite 
consistent with the aforementioned critique of inequality, Rancière advocates for 
egalitarianism. Ultimately, when this chapter concludes, a Rancièrean philosophy 
characterized by dissensus should have taken shape.  
                                                     






Context: Secondary Literature 
While philosophy as a topic is abundant in the secondary literature on Rancière, it 
appears that there is room to more clearly delineate the negative and positive threads that 
make up Rancière’s conception of philosophy. Further, it seems that in general, secondary 
literature in the fields of aesthetics, political philosophy, and philosophy tout court deal 
more directly with Rancière on philosophy, while philosophers of education write more 
about educationally relevant themes within his body of work. The secondary literature 
either deals with Rancière’s critiques of philosophy or refers to central themes within his 
work as his “philosophy”; I have not found a robust account of his metaphilosophy—that 
is, his stance on philosophy itself. As such, there appears to be an opportunity to more fully 
characterize what the positive threads in Rancière’s conception of philosophy might mean, 
particularly if one wants to apply such a conception to a topic like philosophy in schools.  
To give an example of coverage of Rancière on philosophy in the secondary 
literature, Giuseppina Mecchia’s “Philosophy and Its Poor: Rancière’s Critique of 
Philosophy” recounts the general argument found in The Philosopher and His Poor. 
Further, Mecchia summarizes Rancière’s critique of political philosophy that appears in his 
work Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Finally, Mecchia outlines Rancière’s 
conceptual overlaps with the ideas of certain more contemporary philosophers, namely 
Lyotard and Agamben, before concluding her chapter with a summary of why Rancière 
disavows political philosophy (as demonstrated in his Hatred of Democracy). Her 
informative essay leaves me wanting to explore the positive suggestions about philosophy 
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made by Rancière, particularly because of my interest in bringing philosophy to schools. 
Indeed, Mecchia helps to show the kind of philosophy Rancière does not do, but if we 
want to do something with Rancière, this must be framed in the positive.124 
In philosophy of education scholarship, in the edited volume on Rancière by 
Maarten Simons and Jan Masschelein, there is no listing in the index for philosophy – only 
“philosophy in teacher education.”125 Some philosophers of education have shown an 
appreciation for Rancière’s positive characterization of philosophy insofar as he represents 
it as a means of challenging the boundaries of varying discourses, while others have 
casually alluded to his philosophy of education without specifying exactly what it entails. 
126 In Bingham and Biesta’s Jacques Rancière and in Tyson Lewis’ The Aesthetics of 
Education there is no index listing for philosophy.127 My intent is not to claim that 
                                                     
124. With Mecchia, in the “Philosophy” section of Jacques Rancière: Key 
Concepts, edited by philosopher Jean-Philippe Deranty, we also find Deranty’s chapter, 
“Logical Revolts,” which summarizes Rancière’s first works that challenged assumptions 
about who can be philosophical. Also included is “The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Knowledge 
and Authority,” by Yves Citton, which describes The Ignorant Schoolmaster and some 
later works, illuminating some of the critiques and terminology that recur in Rancière’s 
works. Citton refers explicitly to “Rancière’s philosophy,” noting several concepts which 
he argues are at the “core” of this philosophy. Citton, “The Ignorant Schoolmaster,” 31.  
 
125. Masschelein and Simons, “The Hatred of Public Schooling,” 150-165.  
 
126. Ruitenberg, “Distance and Defamiliarisation,” 428; Pelletier, “Rancière’s 
Critique of Bourdieu,” 146; Pelletier, “Poetics,” 270. 
 
127. There also appears to be a lack of analysis of Rancière’s discussion of the 
Principle of Veracity, which is one way that truth is categorized in The Ignorant 
Schoolmaster, the sole work in which the term is used. Neither “principle of veracity” nor 
“veracity” occur in the index of Simons and Masschelin, nor in Bingham and Biesta’s 
book, Jacques Rancière, nor in Tyson Lewis’ Aesthetics of Education. Lewis mentions in 
passing that there have been a few efforts to connect Rancière’s ‘philosophy of education’ 
with specific concepts, but neither of the citations he mentions discuss explicitly 
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philosophy is completely absent from the scholarship on Rancière within philosophy of 
education, but rather to highlight an area where – given my intended application of this to a 
comparison with CPI – this reclamation project may be of service.  
Having summarized the way in which this topic is covered more overtly outside of 
philosophy of education scholarship, I will now elaborate on the three concepts I present as 
alternatives to the three critiques I described in the previous section. This characterization 
will not be finely turned, with postulates and parameters; I am relying instead on a rough 
set of themes that seem pertinent to invoking Rancière in response to the question of why 
or how philosophy should be practiced in K-12 schools, and what that philosophy can or 
should entail.  I approach this comparison by starting first with creativity and absence of a 
permanent site as a contrast to truth, moving on to assertion as a contrast to method, and 
finally, to egalitarianism contrasted with elitism.  
 
Creativity and Absence of Site 
Both creativity and an absence of site serve as alternatives to the problematic 
notion of truth that Rancière attributes to traditional philosophy. Steven Corcoran notes 
that for Rancière, philosophy may be viewed as a “creative practice” that disrupts, in an 
egalitarian fashion, “the prevailing categories governing perception and action.”128 
                                                     
Rancière’s philosophy of education, nor his conception of philosophy. Lewis, “Aesthetic 
Regime,” 55-56. Lewis also refers to “Rancière’s own educational philosophy” yet does 
not refer explicitly to any of Rancière’s positive descriptions of philosophy itself. Lewis, 
“Realm of the Senses,” 286. 
128. Steven Corcoran. “Editor’s Introduction.” In Jacques Rancière’s Dissensus: 
On Politics and Aesthetics, 1-26.  Edited and translated by Steven Corcoran. New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2010, 4. 
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Contrary to a drive toward discovery of truth and acquisition of knowledge, we are looking 
here at a more creative, imaginary impulse that all people have.  
Corcoran writes elsewhere that for Rancière, philosophy, just like politics or art, is 
“displaced with regard to any pre-established site.”129 For Rancière, there is no specific 
fixed site or grounding for politics, philosophy, nor for any of what we might call his 
positive ideals, because establishing a site a priori means essentializing and ontologizing – 
holding on to a “truth” as philosophers so wrongly do. Rancière writes: 
An egalitarian practice of philosophy, as I understand it, is a practice that enacts the 
aporia of foundation (…) I am aware that I am not the only person committed to 
this task. What is thus the specificity of my position? It is that I refuse to ontologize 
a principle of the aporia.130 
 
In this passage, Rancière uses foundation and ontology as synonyms, each representing 
essentialism: a foundation is something that determines everything, giving everything built 
upon it particular constraints, while ontology is also understood as providing a foundation 
(for politics, ethics, and so on).131 Aporia is used just as it is in Platonic texts, marking a 
paradox, conflict, or quandary, which ultimately serves to dismantle preconceived notions, 
disrupt certainty, and challenge the police order (as Rancière would call it).132 If the 
foundation for everything  – and of course this is being applied to the function of schooling 
                                                     
 
129. Corcoran, “Editor’s Introduction,” 22. 
 
130. Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus,” 15. 
 
131. Rancière, “The Thinking of Dissensus,” 14. 
 




in determining where and how graduates can survive within society – is challenged, it 
means that there can be no natural hierarchy, no essence that we must answer to. Turning 
this challenging act into something that has a fixed method, a prescribed set of values to 
uncover (i.e. a drive toward truth), or a designated cohort of practitioners (i.e. professional 
philosophers) would ‘ontologize this aporia’ of philosophy.  
Rancière values creativity and emergence rather than a grounded, foundational 
knowledge base. Philosophy moves and changes through time, rather than being an 
unmoving dialectical foundation, be it literal or figurative, of the sort he takes Plato to rely 
on. In an interview in which he was asked about the meaning of philosophy, Rancière said 
“I would describe philosophy as a place in motion.”133 Such a statement suggests, for 
example, that philosophy need not live within academia, but could travel – say, to K-12 
schools, to the streets, to the corner store. Philosophy is not stuck, and thus must be 
present, alive, active, changing. Convergent with this depiction of philosophy itself as 
figuring transiently in space and time, Samuel Chambers writes that all of Rancière’s work 
contains a “crucial temporal dimension.”134 Commentators such as Kristin Ross, Pelletier, 
Masschelein, and Simons have also focused on this temporal component of Rancière’s 
work.135 Rancière explicitly critiques a “certain temporality” that is implied in traditional 
                                                     
133. Rancière, “Our police order: what can be said, seen, and done: An Interview 
with Jacques Ranciere,” Le Monde diplomatique, (Oslo) 8 November 2006.  
 
134. Samuel Chambers, The Lessons of Rancière (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 31. 
 
135. Kristin Ross, “Historicizing Untimeliness,” In Gabriel Rockhill and Philip 
Watts (eds.), Jacques Rancière: History, Politics, Aesthetics (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2009), 24; Rancière, “Dissenting Words,” 123. 
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pedagogical logic, where the goal is for the student to make progress on a path.136 He also 
explains his notion of a political ‘moment’ as ‘intervening’ in the more predetermined, 
sanctioned forms of government, in his preface to the book (a collection of his interviews) 
named precisely for this ideal, Moments Politiques: Interventions 1977-2009.137 Within 
Rancière’s alternative philosophical temporality, a “place in motion,” we are not focused 
on a linear, fixed developmental pattern, but are instead nurturing emergence and presence. 




There are several authors from outside the philosophy of education field who have 
referred to Rancière’s philosophical method or style. For example, Oliver Davis refers to 
Rancière’s philosophical style as declarative or assertoric rather than explanatory.138 While 
explanatory logic and the explanatory structure of schools were referenced in Chapter 
Two, this notion comes up again when conceiving of Rancière and philosophy generally. 
Explanatory acts, or acts of explication, involve those with prestige, ‘intelligence’, and 
authority allegedly distributing knowledge, thereby implicitly ‘explaining’ that the 
                                                     
 
136. Rancière, “On Ignorant Schoolmasters,” 4. 
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distribution of social roles is due to a disparity of intelligences.139 On the contrary, to assert 
is to include in all statements a kind of unspoken disclaimer that one ought to interpret 
such statements in light of a host of other considerations and that one ought not take such 
statements as an evaluation of the interlocutors.  
Rancière suggests that we might consider a ‘method of equality’ to be a ‘poetics of 
knowledges’ or a ‘politics of knowledge,’ wherein we are vigilant about the power and 
arbitrariness of discursive thought; we can be skeptical about norms derived from alleged 
essentialist evidence, because all people are equal in their capacity to use language and 
meaning.140 He writes,  
philosophy says to those knowledges [savoir] who are certain of their 
methods: methods are recounted stories. This does not mean that they are null 
and void. It means that they are weapons in a war; they are not tools which 
facilitate the examination of a territory but weapons which serve to establish 
its always uncertain boundary.141 
 
The operative word here may in fact be ‘certain.’ In other words, Rancière is not claiming 
to be an authority, and in cases where he offers an evaluative judgment, he intends to hold 
his evaluation humbly. All statements should be admittedly contingent for a philosopher. 
Boundaries are relevant here as well. Rancière urges us to question claims pertaining to 
                                                     
139. In the section of The Ignorant Schoolmaster in which he introduces the 
conception of explication, Rancière writes “explication is the myth of pedagogy,” because 
traditional teaching and learning are predicated on the notion that the teacher has 
knowledge that needs to be explained or explicated for the student who lacks knowledge. 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 6. 
 
140. Rancière, “Thinking Between Disciplines,” 11-12; Pelletier, “Poetics,” 273-
274. 
 




certain divisions between, say, academic disciplines, or conceptions of people. While at 
one time interdisciplinary work was more theoretical, there are now institutes that bring 
together ethicists and bioengineers. While at one time it was not a consideration at the 
institutional level, many colleges and universities now give special attention to First 
Generation students. Philosophy, for Rancière, happens in those moments where assertions 
are made – say, that being the first in your family to pursue a bachelor’s degree poses 
unique challenges and fosters important perspectives, or that we ought to think about the 
moral impacts of gene splicing. These change the landscape of our lived and conceptual 
experience, and are crucial philosophically.  
Assertions like this disrupt value schemas, challenging assumptions and practices 
reflective of the way the police order is parsed. When an assertion is made, for Rancière, it 
presupposes – though he does not use the language – an assumption of rights on behalf of 
the speaker. Assertions presuppose a capacity to understand, thus entailing the assumption 
of equality of intelligence Rancière promotes. Assertion is contrasted to method because it 
is not a simple negation of existing forms or norms; assertion is not predictable, nor 
contingent on existing binaries. 
 
Egalitarianism 
As should already be readily apparent, Rancière’s critique of the field of 
philosophy challenges academics, himself included, to be skeptical about any of their 
claims to having a better understanding of things, via philosophical reasoning, than do 
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those in other professions.142 He contends that philosophy inherently challenges any 
narratives that suggest that there is an inequality among intelligences: “what the 
philosopher declares (...) is that inequality is an artifice, a story which is imposed.”143 
Removing adherence to essentialism (as he has done by advocating for creativity) is 
egalitarian insofar as it verifies that society itself is constructed through arbitrary roles. His 
insistence, once again, is that philosophers should not assume that equality is an end that 
can be achieved via the state or some alternative to it. Rather, equality is continually 
enacted through our assumptions.  
To say that philosophy itself is egalitarian is to say that philosophy allows us to see 
through arbitrariness and to question conventions, constructs, and assumptions. To say that 
philosophy is egalitarian is to highlight that all participants are equally privy to this feature 
of reality. This empowers all and undermines any pretense that there are only certain 
people who can access truth. Replacing elitism with egalitarianism is a crucial component 
of Rancière’s positive view of philosophy. He writes: 
Classically, philosophy has been considered a sort of super-discipline which 
reflects on the methods of the human and social sciences, or which provides them 
with their foundation. Thus a hierarchical order is established in the universe of 
discourse. Of course these sciences can object to this status, treat it as an illusion 
and pose itself as the true knowledge of philosophical illusion. This is another 
hierarchy, another way of putting discourses in their place. But there is a third way 
of proceeding, which seizes the moment in which the philosophical pretension to 
found the order of discourse is reversed, becoming the declaration, in the 
egalitarian language of the narrative, of the arbitrary nature of this order.144 
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143. Rancière, “Thinking Between Disciplines,” 8. 
 




It is an ungrounding that philosophy fosters, but only when one assumes an equality of 
intelligences, when one recognizes the universal contingency of all discursive utterances. 
The way we speak about the world and organize into social roles could be otherwise, and 
indeed we have evidence of this when looking across history and at the present moment, 
observing our myriad languages and ways of life. For example, in some cultures, people 
with mental health conditions are scorned or left to fend for themselves, while in others 
they are deemed prophetic and wise, or are granted access to the health care that they need. 
Philosophy – in the third way that Rancière describes above, and which I refer to as the 
positive account – shows us that our attempts to attach our understanding of arbitrary 
social constructions to a concept of truth need to be challenged. In my reading, his work 
ultimately shows us that there is an assumption of some kind underlying everything, and 
that such assumptions betray a value system that can be more or less egalitarian.145  
 In academia there is often conversation about the importance of the humanities, and 
whether they are a kind of additive discipline that comes after the sciences, or whether 
science is informed by the humanities. Philosophers within this debate often zero in on 
philosophy as the driving force behind scientific discovery and application of scientific 
                                                     
 
145. I appreciate this line of reasoning, in which we highlight the kind of 
assumption necessary for all things to operate. A similar argument, using the notion of 
faith, is found in Leo Tolstoy: “If a man lives he believes in something. If he did not 
believe that one must live for something, he would not live. If he does not see and 
recognize the illusory nature of the finite, he believes in the finite; if he understands the 
illusory nature of the finite, he must believe in the infinite. Without faith he cannot live.” 




breakthroughs (e.g. the morality behind robots replacing humans in the workforce). 
Rancière brackets this debate, arguing that philosophy should not position itself as 
authoritative. Instead, philosophy should be more modest, because it is fundamentally 
egalitarian, challenging hierarchies altogether.146 Where you fall on the side of stipulating 
the power of philosophy or reason and what that entails may say more about your motives 
than any alleged truth of the matter.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have categorized Rancière’s central critiques of philosophy as 
pertaining to elitism, method, and truth. His respective alternatives include egalitarianism, 
assertion, and creativity or sitelessness. Dissensus, as outlined in Chapter Two, is a helpful 
term for generally conceiving of the more positive act of philosophizing that emerges from 
Rancière’s critiques and alternatives. Despite his resistance to grounding or locating 
philosophy, opting instead for an emergent or fluid conception, Rancière insists on a 
constant heterogeneity, a meeting of worlds. 147 This obtains regardless of philosophy, 
because it is a consequence of the equality of intelligence. However, philosophy points us 
to the fact that we are necessarily unable to reach consensus due to the barriers of 
perspective and place, confined as we are to our respective ‘worlds.’ Philosophy celebrates 
dissensus. As Rancière writes:   
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it is possible to define a certain dissensual practice of philosophy as an activity of 
de-classification that undermines all policing of domains and formulas. It does so 
not for the sole pleasure of deconstructing the master's discourse, but in order to 
think the lines according to which boundaries and passages are constructed, 
according to which they are conceivable and modifiable. This critical practice of 
philosophy is an inseparably egalitarian, or anarchistic, practice, since it considers 
arguments, narratives, testimonies, investigations and metaphors all as the equal 
inventions of a common capacity in a common language. Engaging in critique of 
the instituted divisions, then, paves the way for renewing our interrogations into 
what we are able to think and do.148  
 
This view of philosophy as a disruptive practice is Rancière’s response to his worries about 
elitism, method, and truth. It is egalitarian rather than elitist, assertive rather than 
methodological, and rests on the creativity of each person rather than on an objective 
notion of truth. To consider how this could ever transpire in a school, given his issues with 
schooling as covered I in Chapter Two, I move in the next chapter to looking at a specific 
pedagogy that I argue aligns quite well with Rancière’s critiques and positive conceptions 
of philosophy. In the following chapter I compare Rancière with the theory and practice of 
community of philosophical inquiry, in an attempt to find out if and how his practice of 
philosophy may can be relevant in schools, despite the inherent problems associated with 
schooling itself.  
  
                                                     





CHAPTER FOUR  
 
RANCIÈRE AND  
COMMUNITY OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY  
 
 
In the preceding chapters I introduced Rancière’s views on schooling and on 
philosophy, distinguishing between his critiques and his alternatives for each. Regarding 
schooling, we are left with a recognition of the inherent problems with schools but are 
encouraged to find ways that allow for the benefits of dissensus, whenever and wherever it 
occurs in schools. With respect to philosophy, we come away from the last chapter with 
reasons to be cautious of academic philosophy, but also to be hopeful that philosophy in 
schools can enhance or support dissensus. 
I would now like to introduce community of philosophical inquiry (CPI) as one 
kind of dissensual, philosophical practice in schools, making the case that CPI is notably 
consistent with the critiques and norms surrounding schooling and philosophy that I have 
gleaned from Rancière. What I argue in this chapter is that Rancière’s positive conception 
of philosophy both supports the efforts to introduce CPI into K-12 schools and cautions us 
against the idea that this will create perfect schools. Enacting Rancière’s positive 
conception of philosophy in schools may not even be possible. Within the secondary 
literature on Rancière, there has yet to be work done on how his positive conception of 
philosophy can be applied to efforts to bring philosophy to schools. Within the secondary 
CPI literature there has yet to be an account of how Rancière’s critiques of both schooling 
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and philosophy align with and may inform the principles and application of CPI. It is my 
hope that my efforts will contribute to each of these areas.149  
In the “Schooling” section of this chapter I go over some ways that Rancière’s 
views on schooling as covered in Chapter Two correspond with the critiques and solutions 
to schooling that are implied in or inherent to CPI. Moving on to the “Philosophy” section 
of this chapter, I offer a comparison between Rancière’s views of traditional philosophy as 
described in Chapter Three and the critiques of philosophy and alternative norms implied 
or explicit in CPI. I do not organize these sections by the compartmentalization of terms I 
followed in Chapters Two and Three, which helped to lay the foundation for this 
comparison. Instead, much in the same manner as Rancière himself, I weave together 
themes and terms in order to convey one way in which the affinity between CPI and 
Rancière can be represented. This approach of thinking through the connections between 
CPI and Rancière also allows me to seamlessly introduce adjacent topics found within CPI 
that did not arise in the chapters strictly devoted Rancière, so as to set up for the following 
chapter, which thinks through applying Rancière and CPI to existing and new schools. 
Prior to delving into the two main sections of this chapter, I offer a gloss on exactly what 




                                                     
149. It may go without saying, but Rancière himself has not written about CPI, and 
I would wager that he has not heard of it. 
75 
 
Context: The History and Practice of Community of Philosophical Inquiry 
To give some context for this chapter, the CPI model I focus on was originally 
articulated by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, and has been used in schools and 
programs within the U.S. for over forty years now.150 It is a subset of the larger philosophy 
for/with children and philosophy in schools movement.151 Though this chapter should 
make apparent why I have chosen this particular model as a kind of case study for thinking 
through Rancière’s critiques and norms surrounding schooling and philosophy, I will still 
offer this disclaimer: there are many other arguments and practices within philosophy in 
schools that are worth considering in light of Rancière, but I am limiting my focus for the 
purpose of this dissertation. Many practitioners of philosophy in schools do great work 
without ever making use of the CPI model. There are entire schools that may indeed be 
attractive alternatives to traditional public schools, and that might fit with Rancière’s 
                                                     
150. The history of the use of community of philosophical inquiry in schools is 
presented well in Maughn Rollins Gregory and David Granger, “Introduction: John Dewey 
on Philosophy and Childhood,” Education and Culture 28, no. 2 (2012): 1-25. It should 
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philosophical notion of community of inquiry into a model of educational practice.” See 
Maughn Rollins Gregory and Megan Jane Laverty, 1-17 “Introduction” in In Community of 
Inquiry with Ann Margaret Sharp: Childhood, Philosophy and Education (New York: 
Routledge, 2018), 1. 
 
151. As explained by Joanna Haynes and Karin Murris, the original reason that a 
distinction was made between philosophy “for” and philosophy “with” children was 
because when Karin Murris developed a new way of using picture books as prompts for 
philosophy in elementary schools, Lipman asked her to distinguish it from the method he 
was already writing about. See Joanna Haynes and Karin Murris, “An Epistemological 
Shift in Teacher Education through Philosophy with Children.” In Philosophy for Children 
in Transition: Problems and Prospects, 117-136. Edited by Nancy Vansieleghem and 




critiques and norms, but that do not make use of any notion of philosophy in their structure 
nor pedagogy. There are also philosophers who offer critiques of philosophy akin to 
Rancière’s, who again, for the purposes of this specific project, I am not exploring. In sum, 
the focus on Rancière and CPI is a way to zero in on some of my own questions about 
philosophy and schools, and in no way is meant to discredit others who have considered or 
applied similar ideas in different contexts. I am not arguing that CPI is the only logical 
application of Rancière’s views in the context of schooling. 
CPI is a central practice for many facilitators of philosophy for children, or those 
who bring philosophy to K-12 schools.152 The practice can be applied at the college or 
university level as well, but I am looking at the K-12 level because in the U.S. this level of 
schooling is compulsory, making it problematic from the Rancièrian perspective.153 The 
method follows core elements as rearticulated by Lipman and summarized by Gregory as 
such: a text is shared; students raise questions generated by the reading of this text and 
plan the order in which to collectively go about trying to answering them; students engage 
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for children implementation see Maughn Rollins Gregory, “Precollege Philosophy 
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for Philosophers and Teachers, 69-85. Edited by Sara Goering, Nicholas J. Shudak, and 
Thomas E. Wartenberg. New York: Routledge, 2013, 73.  
 
153. For an example of how community of philosophical inquiry can be 
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and Megan Jane Laverty, “Evaluating Classroom Dialogue: Reconciling internal and 
external accountability,” in Theory and Research in Education 5, no. 3 (2007): 281-310. I 
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in a CPI dialogue on the questions; the facilitator introduces activities that revolve around 
the relevant philosophical topics; and finally, there is some form of reflection on the 
practice.154 While there are variations of how CPI is used, the model I am working with 
here is based on what I learned while attending the Montclair State University Institute for 
the Advancement of Philosophy for Children 2013 Summer Residential Workshop.155  
When formulating the questions at the start of the inquiry session, there is typically 
quite a bit of work on the part of the facilitator to help ensure that the questions are 
sufficiently philosophical. To give an example, the class might read a story about a woman 
who decided to protest outside of a factory farm. A student could pose a question like “did 
the farm owner know her before she decided to protest?” This would be an empirical 
question, and one that either could not be answered within the circle, or one that could 
simply be answered by gathering more facts; this would not be a philosophical question. 
A philosophical question – the only kind a CPI should try to answer – is one that 
members can disagree about, and can try to answer within the circle without relying on 
experts, and is not empirical. In the Handbook, James Heinegg relays Joe Oyler’s four 
common kinds of philosophical questions: they are questions about meaning, questions 
about right and wrong, questions about how we can know things, and questions about 
reality.156 Questions like these embody underlying philosophical concepts that Laurance 
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155. Maughn Rollins Gregory, Philosophy for Children Practitioner Handbook. 
Montclair: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 2008, 11-12; 47. 
 
156. James Heinegg, “Introduction,” in Philosophy for Children Practitioner 
Handbook. Montclair: Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, 2008, 88. 
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Splitter and Ann Sharp characterize as being common to the experiences of all inquirers, 
central to how we understand our experiences, and contestable in terms of how we define 
them.157 If we are to return to the example involving the story of the woman protesting the 
factory farm, the group might instead formulate a question like “are there conditions that 
make killing morally acceptable?” The group might thus need to grapple with the concept 
of morality during their inquiry session. 
One aspect of starting a CPI session that often takes some time is the selection of 
the question or questions that the group should attempt to answer. Gregory’s summary of 
CPI protocol mentions that students plan the order in which they would like to try to 
answer various questions. What this entails is writing the proposed questions on the board 
and voting on which question students are most interested in, generating relevant sub-
questions of the chosen question as needed. Generally speaking, the questions need to be 
crystalized down to their philosophical core before they are all voted on, but it can be done 
in the opposite order as well. As such, sometimes the voting takes time, but clarifying the 
question that was voted on takes even longer. The process, rather than expedient results, 
products, or answers is key here.158  
As made apparent in the previous chapter, Rancière may not be comfortable with 
formalizing any kind of method. As such, insisting on certain conditions, such as the 
formation of philosophical questions, might seem too methodological. Structurally 
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democratic practices should also be viewed with a suspicious eye, according to Rancière, 
though it is not apparent that he would object to mere voting on a question with a K-12 
classroom. I will weave my responses to some such worries throughout this chapter. 
Having given a general overview of CPI, I now move on to some critiques and norms 
surrounding schooling, found within the practice of CPI in order to consider in more detail 
how these correspond with those of Rancière. 
 
Schooling 
This section addresses the key educational themes I covered in Chapter Two. As a 
reminder, there I described Rancière’s critiques of inequality and stultification, showing 
how these inspire his normative assumption of equality of intelligence. Also, I described 
Rancière’s critiques of truth and explanation, contrasted with his norm of the belief in the 
separation between language and truth. Finally, I described his critique of progress, 
contrasted with the value of dissensus. In this section my goal is to suggest ways in which 
CPI is sympathetic to these critiques and norms of schooling.  
Inequality and stultification are of concern to both Rancière and proponents of CPI, 
although the latter do not use either term. As covered in Chapter Two, we can distinguish 
between schooling on the one hand and education, or learning, on the other. In Rancière’s 
terminology, education is seen as something positive, while schooling is problematic.159 
Education and learning appear to be exempt from the radical suspicion with which 
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Rancière argues we should regard schools, which are institutions designed to recognize and 
sort intelligence and capacity. Rancière poses us with the challenge, as Caroline Pelletier 
writes, “to suspend the whole system of recognition, and the perverse satisfaction that it 
affords.”160 Again, Rancière condemns those who intend to use schools to produce 
equality, much in the same way that he condemns those philosophers who propose that 
they can order society with their knowledge. Rancière does not believe that any social 
institutions can legitimately produce harmony or consensus. Indeed, such an occurrence 
would be troubling from Rancière’s perspective. The social order that schools, formal 
government, and all institutions comprise, is based on what Rancière refers to “sheer 
contingency.”161 All social roles could be otherwise, but we have decided on these 
hierarchies and specializations to function as a society. It is key for Rancière that all 
hierarchies are only possible because of an “ultimate anarchy” on which they all rest; all 
social roles are possible only because there is a primordial equality that exists among all 
humans.162  
CPI directly challenges the hierarchy and inequality in a traditional classroom, 
where the teacher has knowledge and must find out which of her students are also 
knowledgeable.163 By making the development of questions a group activity with no 
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specific outcome or educative endgame, CPI is less about assessing individual students and 
more about the egalitarian assessment of the community itself. This is a different kind of 
paradigm from schooling where students are individually evaluated based on their 
apprehension of certain bits of knowledge. A facilitator in an inquiry session does not 
explain concepts to students but joins in reasoning them through with the group; she need 
not be an expert.164 Indeed, the facilitator is often simply following and commenting on the 
dynamics of the collective dialogue, rather than engaging with content.165 As such, CPI 
avoids explanation and its consequent stultification.  
We might say that there is the requirement that every participant understand the 
different dialogical moves or the parameters of the inquiry; as such, there is some initial 
explanation of these moves and parameters that takes place. However, there is a built-in 
dimension whereby CPI forecloses on the possibility of stultification: the goal is always for 
the students themselves to be able to self-facilitate, either simply by being or becoming 
metacognitively self-aware as an inquiring  group such that no individual facilitator is 
needed, or by having individual students take turns as facilitator. As Thomas Jackson 
explains, “in a mature community, the teacher/facilitator will be a coequal 
facilitator/participant,” because each member of the community will naturally use the 
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protocols of dialogue within the community.166 Analogously to the ignorant schoolmaster 
for Rancière, some argue that the CPI facilitator is meant to be self-effacing, purposely 
distancing herself from traditional teacher authority and instead present as an inquirer 
among inquirers (her students).167 Rancière’s critique of inequality and stultification are in 
line with CPI’s avoidance of a traditional teacher authority and the typical emphasis on 
atomic individuals as retainers of knowledge. 
The focus on a common text is a practice in both a CPI and in the practice called 
universal teaching that Rancière uses as an examplary model in the Ignorant 
Schoolmaster.168 For CPI and universal teaching, the common text is meant to be a 
starting-off point for something other than transmission. While the facilitator in a CPI does 
not necessarily draw the class back to the common text, she will direct the group back to 
the original question of concern in the moment if necessary (it is perfectly acceptable for 
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an inquiry to end up as a pursuit of unforeseen concepts or questions generated once the 
attempt at answering the original question is underway.)169  
The common text is meant to be a shared ground.170 Just as is stipulated for a CPI 
stimulus, an emancipatory experience under universal teaching requires that one is not told 
how to interpret a text.171 Pedagogically, the shared text in both universal teaching and CPI 
displaces the traditional hierarchy associated with knowledge. The hierarchies here are 
slightly different because universal teaching treats knowledge as something of an object 
that we can still somewhat apprehend, with the dangerous hierarchy being that between 
student and teacher where the teacher is assumed to have the knowledge. A CPI also 
challenges the notion that the teacher has the knowledge, but it is further contesting 
knowledge itself, treating it the public process rather than the result as the most objective 
thing (i.e. the object of knowledge).172  
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The Rancièrian assumption of equality of intelligence is more or less consistent 
with principles of CPI.173 The very structure of a CPI involves all community participants 
in the active search for answers, development of questions, and reflection. As Nadia and 
David Kennedy put it, CPI entails distributed intelligence and distributed agency, whereby 
there is no locus of either, but they are equal among all parties.174 David Kennedy 
elsewhere writes that “in the event of philosophy, life and language take on a new, 
problematic relationship, and the aporias it invokes give intimations of an ungraspable 
whole.”175 Members of the community are de facto valuable, with valuable perspectives 
and lines of reasoning that can contribute to collective knowledge – assuming that there is 
no breach in the expectations of community life. If a CPI session is practiced in the ideal 
way, all students are equal – even with the teacher.176 An ignorant schoolmaster assumes 
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equality and guides her students with her will through the space of possibility rather than 
toward a set end or value.177 Not only is this type of improvisation supported by CPI 
scholarship, but it has also been argued that such communities can thereby protect against 
“the power of official knowledge” and can thus liberalize the curriculum.178  
Both Rancière and CPI assume in a broad sense that everyone equally has a 
connection to truth – that no one has a special relationship to truth, correctness, or 
legitimacy, but that we each have a will that is a source of both individual and collective 
strength. CPI advocates do not necessarily agree on whether truth is or should be the goal 
in inquiry or in life, nor do they agree on whether truth exists. The implication of engaging 
in dialogue as the means of answering questions is that participants have a role in the 
process, rather than merely following the procedure of seeking answers via consultation 
with experts. There is value in the process itself. As Karel L. van der Leeuw writes, 
“Philosophical dialogue is a specific attempt to live in a common reality with other rational 
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beings; it is a practice that serves no other purpose.”179 The explicator tries to reason about 
the will, quantify it, qualify it, and order it – perhaps in desire for certainty and control. For 
Rancière, it is precisely at that point where we must be wary, and where we need to trust in 
that which we cannot control.180 Indeed, by placing trust in students to use their capacities 
to decide what they want to think and how they want to think it, we may be pleasantly 
surprised by the emergence of previously unimagined ways of being.181 
This same kind of trust is invoked in the principle of following the inquiry where it 
leads within CPI, and by incorporating relevant perspectives from the group. For example, 
any group member can introduce a counter example from their own lives, or dispute the 
importance of a question based on whether or not it feels important to them. Lipman 
argues that when facilitators draw on their own experience or the experiences of the 
students, this contributes to overall peace in the larger community.182 The dialogue may 
cause some unease, some disequilibrium, as statements and questions are problematized 
and challenged.183 Nonetheless, we can trust in the process of dialogue.  
                                                     
179. Karel L. van der Leeuw: “Philosophical Dialogue and the Search for Truth” in 
Thinking: the Journal of Philosophy for Children 17, no. 3 (2005), 23. 
 
180. As Rancière writes, when referring to his more normative conception of 
democracy rather than the formal type he critiques, “the test of democracy must ever be in 
democracy’s own image: versatile, sporadic – and founded on trust.” Rancière, On the 
Shores of Politics, 61. 
181. Yusef Waghid and Nuraan Davids “On the (Im)possibility of Democratic 
Citizenship Education in the Arab and Muslim World,” Studies in Philosophy and 
Education (2014): 351. 
 
182. Matthew Lipman, Thinking in Education, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 108-109. 
 
183. Lipman, Thinking in Education, 87. 
87 
 
Recognizing multiple perspectives in a CPI is very important, but this should not be 
mistaken for relativism, for the objectivity of this relational pedagogy lies in a necessary 
joint recognition of one’s biases and perspectival limitations, as well as a desire to grapple 
with ambiguities.184 This notion of relational pedagogy has some similarity to Rancière’s 
notion of veracity, wherein we all have truth within us that cannot directly be expressed 
through language. We reason together when we try to make ourselves (and our ‘truths’) 
understood. Rancière writes: 
Reason begins when discourses organized with the goal of being right cease, begins 
where equality is recognized: not an equality decreed by law or force, not a 
passively received equality, but an equality in act, verified, at each step by those 
marchers who, in their constant attention to themselves and in their endless 
revolving around the truth, find the right sentences to make themselves understood 
by others.185 
 
The truth described here is not something that is outside and able to be found or 
discovered, and it is not something that can finally be articulated if only it is described or 
defined in the right way. In fact, such a notion of truth could allow for someone to be 
“right,” when for Rancière, it is unreasonable to even have such a goal. Discourse, for 
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Rancière and for CPI, is productive to the extent that it respects what we share as well as 
our inherent difference. Megan Laverty describes this seeming paradox: 
Dialogical philosophical inquiry is premised on a condition of universal human 
sameness. It is constituted in the recognition that individuals are defined in 
relationship to their ongoing engagement with concepts, as conditions for the 
possibility of meaning. (…) Dialogical philosophical inquiry is also premised on 
our irrevocable differences, the contingent and significant nature of these 
differences, and our failure to communicate effectively. We rely on one another to 
verify our conceptual understanding, and yet, the possibilities for such a conceptual 
understanding rely on our responsiveness to others in our relationships with 
them.186 
 
We each have our own perspective and relation to the truth. Our ability to discourse or 
reason together is predicated on there being a limitation to what we can jointly determine 
to be right or true. In a CPI we can surely disregard invalid inferences, unclear definitions, 
and so on, but there will never be a conclusion reached that entirely discounts the felt 
experience or perspective of one or more community members.187  
Rancière encourages teachers not to assert possession of knowledge, but instead to 
be authority figures that direct students down the path of exercising their own pre-existing 
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capacities, or their will.188 Universal teaching involves, as Lewis puts it, a shift from 
intelligence to will, and certainly requires seeing a distinction between intelligence and 
will.189 There is no predestined object of knowledge that must be willed; it is the 
recognition of will itself. In this way, an ignorant schoolmaster can “teach” what they do 
not know, encouraging their students to make an effort toward their goals. An example of 
this that ought to be relatable for all parents is helping your child do their homework: you 
do not need to know the content to encourage your child, check that they are on task, 
assess whether they are engaged with what they have done, and so on. Interestingly, 
employers do the same thing by having employees report on their progress on some 
technical aspect of their jobs that the bosses would not themselves know how to do. With 
Rancière, this is getting at the fact that knowledge of the content has little to do with the 
relationship of one will to another. A CPI facilitator, as mentioned previously, is “self-
effacing”: she/he will not necessarily contribute content, but instead remark on connections 
being made, definitions that are being formed, etc. The facilitator helps with form, not 
content, encouraging the will of her/his students. 
Another commonality between Rancière’s work and that of some CPI scholars is 
evidenced by their respective discussions of progress and development. For Rancière, 
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when schools operate under the pretense of helping people achieve academically despite 
alleged “intellectual deficiencies,” schools only further contribute to the idea that learning 
is contingent on recognition of inferiority and subsequent growth, development, or 
progress.190 Further, having pre-determined ends for a school ignores the ambiguity and 
uncertainty of its potential; allowing participants to truly get something meaningful out of 
school requires room for their uniqueness.191 Just as Rancière critiques pedagogies that 
assume a linear development model, wherein progress and development are explained by 
the people and the institutions with the alleged knowledge, so too do CPI practitioners 
possess skepticism toward pedagogies that treat children as adults in training.192 Linear 
pedagogy itself presupposes an ending or at least a trajectory. 
A number of authors within the CPI literature have argued for the incongruity of 
CPI principles and schooling, and have emphasized the difficulty of accommodating the 
current demand for accountability through standardized performance metrics in schools.193 
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Standardization and assessment of public schools are literal examples of the police order. 
However, as radical as CPI is, I conjecture that Rancière would still say it is part of the 
police order. 194 Shared concepts, shared measurements, and all roles that exist in a social 
institution and in social interactions are predicated on arbitrary, ends-based social 
constructions. Our relationship to the truth and our inherent value and intelligence, which 
we all possess equally, should be recognized as separate from anything we determine 
socially.  
In arguing for a critical philosophy of childhood as a component of CPI in 
elementary schools, Walter Kohan has written about the ability for philosophy with 
children to indeed help call into question the very distinction between children and adults, 
thus problematizing the police order in which “child” and “adult” are constructed.195 On 
this account, Rancière and CPI are thus in agreement that philosophy can play a role in 
destabilizing the social roles inherent and implied in schools.  
Rancière refers to school as an ambiguous form that contains a mingling of 
meanings dependent on each participant’s vision for the school and its function.196 The 
school is thus: 
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the site of permanent negotiation of equality between the democratic state and the 
democratic individual: a manifold negotiation which, to unequal and often 
contradictory expectations, offers gains and losses which are infinitely more 
complex than those conceived of by the analysis of educational ‘failure.’197 
The school as a form of gathering, is a break from the production of everyday life, yet this 
kind of break only functions as such for those who have the affluence and the desire to 
treat it as such. School is not solely for leisure, nor is its activity detached from survival 
but is a site of “permanent negotiation” among participants.198 This notion of negotiation is 
reminiscent of the general idea of democracy, which is certainly prevalent as an ideal 
among CPI advocates. Rancière makes strong critiques of democracy as an institutional 
practice, arguing that real democracy happens when previously accepted ways of being, 
speaking, thinking, etc., are disrupted. 
While some CPI practitioners see inquirers as becoming better participants of 
formal democracy, Rancière critiques formal democracy in favor of total, though 
impermanent, disruption to the form of democracy/politics – disruption which he argues is 
actual democracy/politics.199 For Rancière, this is dissensus – it is what philosophy ought 
to be.  Along the same lines, some scholars argue that CPI supports the moral and civic 
development of children, and most would agree that CPI helps students to develop into 
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better thinkers, but these are notions of which Rancière is highly critical.200 Granted, CPI 
theorists seem to have a range of meanings when they refer to the democratic benefits of 
introducing K-12 students to philosophy through CPI.201 It should also be noted that there 
are cases where CPI proponents explicitly challenge the idealization of democracy and 
democratic practices within the field.202 Indeed, one such figure, Walter Kohan, shares 
with Rancière this very insistence that philosophy is a kind of dissensus or interval, and 
that it ought not to have aims like ‘contributing to democracy.’ He writes: 
When philosophy is the official voice of a politics or a morality – whether 
aristocratic or democratic, liberal or authoritarian – it loses its subversive and 
transformative power. Moreover, when any morality, politics, or religion is set up 
as a purpose of philosophy, philosophy itself becomes impossible. If philosophy is 
possible at all, it is because morality, politics, religion constitute an empty space, an 
interrogation, an interval.203 
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Alas, there is a divergence between those within CPI who advocate for this kind of 
subversive nature of philosophy, and those who argue for its democratizing effects.204 For 
the purposes of my project, I will not attempt to parse out what these nuanced differences 
are, for it seems that such a project, while very worthwhile, would be a large undertaking 
in itself.205  In general, I can assert that I side with those advocates of CPI who value 
nonlinear movement through dialogue, emphasizing emergent properties and the process 
itself rather than any outcome that is useful for participation in society at large.206 For 
example, Kennedy and Kennedy refer to CPI as a dynamic discursive structure that is 
never completed and that “could be described as a non-linear, self-organizing 
communication and argumentation system that presents itself as linear.”207  
Insofar as I share Rancière’s critiques of democracy as an institution or formal 
process, my perspective appears to be in the minority here. Even though I believe, for 
example, that symbolic and informal logic are invaluable for students to learn, making it 
easier for them to detect faulty argumentation emanating from the media and authority 
figures, and even though I do believe that by participating in CPI students can become 
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more empathic, better listeners, and so on, I do not register the value of these things in 
terms of their applicability to democracy. I may be willing to make this kind of argument 
for pragmatic purposes, but in my view, understanding CPI in terms of its contribution to 
democracy presupposes too much about democracy that could potentially discount or 
contradict the very assumptions within Rancière’s system that I affirm.  
To explain this in slightly different terms, what draws me to the values shared by 
Rancière and CPI is more in the realm of universal ethical or metaphysical beliefs about 
the world and others, than in the realm of pragmatic beliefs about contemporary issues. 
The important takeaway for now from my coverage of the topic of schooling in relation to 
democracy for CPI and for Rancière is that there is not full agreement. It is hard to know 
whether CPI advocates mention the democratic payoffs of the practice in all cases because 
they believe democracy is a primary good, or because it is merely useful in demonstrating 
the value of CPI. Hence, this topic will come up elsewhere in this dissertation when I 
consider the justifications for CPI that are necessary when soliciting buy-in from schools. 
Returning to the project of reviewing similarities, Lipman distinguishes between 
schooling and education in order to contrast convention and conformity with the practice 
of good judgment. Good judgment, he argues, is nurtured within a CPI session, which he 
argues are more often contrary to any consensus.208 This aligns with Rancière’s notion of 
dissensus. Indeed, Karin Murris has suggested that CPI is beneficial because it uses 
prompts that challenge norms and social mores, and urges students to move beyond 
                                                     




political correctness and to say what they really think.209 Communities of philosophical 
inquiry, she argues, following Biesta’s work on Rancière, thrive on dissensus, not 
consensus.210  
To give an example of what we might call dissensus in a CPI, I will draw from a 
dialogue excerpt from Nathan Brubaker, recorded when he was facilitating in a fifth grade 
classroom. Students were discussing whether the purpose of going to school is to learn to 
think. They were agreeing with one another that you go to school and learn from others 
what types of things are wrong because they repeat it to you over and over. One student 
disagreed, and changed the example they were using to discuss the topic: 
Thelma: Well I kind of disagree with Aruba when she said that if more and more 
people keep telling you that this is right then you’re going to, then eventually 
you’re going to come to the decision that everyone else is right and you’re wrong.  
 










Nathan: …that would give you an answer. 
 
Thelma: No, but if you, okay, I’m going to change Clifford’s example…211 
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In this example, Thelma not only disagreed with her classmates but was dissatisfied with 
the inference that the facilitator was drawing from her statements. She held out in order to 
get her point across, willing to disagree with her teacher and classmates, and insisting that 
the example be changed. Later in the dialogue she was able to restate her initial position 
slightly differently: 
I’m just saying that if, if fifty thousand people tell you that something is, that guns 
are good, that you’re not necessarily going to believe them just because fifty 
thousand people tell you that you’re wrong. It’s, I’m trying to tell Aruba that I 
don’t think that the more people that tell you you’re wrong, that you’re going to 
believe them.212  
 
Ironically, this dialogue literally dealt with the topic of consensus, and it is refreshing to 
see that Thelma had an objection to the alleged inherent value of consensus. However, the 
example is also helpful because Thelma demonstrated dissensus by disagreeing and 
insisting on a new example. With Joanna Haynes, Murris states that CPI pedagogy: 
thrives on dissensus and disagreement as it enables opinions to be put to the test 
(…) guided by experienced facilitators who need to be able to have the courage to 
be moved and changed by what happens in a community with others who are 
different from them.213  
 
As argued here, CPI thus assumes an equality of intelligence, acknowledges a separation 
between language and truth, and values dissensus. Having covered the many ways in 
which CPI aligns with Rancière on schooling, let us now look at some conceptions of 
philosophy that can be attributed to proponents of CPI.  
                                                     
 
212. Brubaker, Notes from the Field,” 50.  
 






In Chapter Three I parsed Rancière’s critique of philosophy as a focus on elitism, 
method, and truth, and in describing his more positive account of philosophy, I posed the 
values of egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity. This section refers back to these 
critiques and norms so as to consider their fit with CPI. Again, there are plenty of other 
critiques of philosophy that Rancière makes that may be consistent with CPI, and which I 
did not cover in Chapter Three and cannot cover here. The purpose of condensing 
Rancière’s critiques and norms of schooling and philosophy into smaller concepts is, 
again, to focus this study, and to make my case that there are similarities between Ranciere 
and CPI that may help us to think through the question of the possibility of philosophy in 
schools.  
Those within the philosophy for/with children movement who choose to use CPI 
seem to share Rancière’s critique of the elitism of traditional philosophy, albeit 
unknowingly. Traditional philosophy has been labeled “Big P Philosophy” by proponents 
of CPI, echoing Rancière’s argument that traditional philosophy perpetuates hierarchy.214 
Proponents Amber Strong Makaiau and Chad Miller write that “Like Plato’s philosopher 
kings, “Big P” philosophers are members of an exclusive club, accessible only to those 
rare souls who have endured a long period of academic preparation.”215 “Little p” 
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philosophy, they argue, is nurtured in a CPI by way of recognizing the wonder and ability 
to ask questions that is inherent in all people from a young age.  
David Kennedy argues that CPI is continually reconstructing philosophy216 In order 
to characterize this reconstruction he argues that:  
this reconstructive impulse is fed both by the introduction of genuine communal 
dialogue into philosophical practice – which is a fulfillment of the Socratic promise 
– and the induction of children into that practice, which represents a challenge to 
philosophical practice as a white adult male domain governed by a narrow view of 
human reason.217  
 
Kennedy is speaking here of the need for reconstructing “Big P” philosophy, just as 
Rancière has done in his critique of traditional philosophy. The description of philosophy 
as being under the domain of white males and a narrow view of human reason reveals 
Kennedy’s belief that this is problematically elitist. As shown in Chapter Three, Rancière 
has the same issue with traditional philosophy. Reconstruction of philosophy occurs when 
we practice CPI because we are subverting the potential for elitism and are instead 
upholding an egalitarian model, wherein it is assumed that everyone is capable of 
reasoning. If we take Rancière’s positive iterations of philosophy as also implying this 
kind of reconstructive impulse – never as a permanent reconstruction, but a temporary 
destabilization of concepts – then Rancière arguably supports “little p” philosophy.  
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Rancière and CPI share another commonality insofar as they are concerned about 
philosophy viewed solely as method. They value, on the contrary, the power of assertion. I 
should preface this topic by stating that this is somewhat of a grey area, so I am 
highlighting it as a point of tension that Rancière and CPI share. Stephen Miller writes – 
after disparaging Rancière’s The Ignorant Schoolmaster – that: 
philosophy, when understood properly, should make us unlearn much of what we 
believe, should make us uncomfortable, should make us uncertain and should 
ultimately, then, make us stronger and better.218  
 
Even though Rancière would surely agree with a number of these alleged outcomes of 
philosophy, and with Miller’s drawing attention to the kind of positive picture of 
philosophy I want to bring out in Rancière, the language of “better” may be problematic.219 
This notion of making students better through some activity that takes place at school is 
precisely the notion that gets called into question by Rancière’s political theory and 
consequently by his positive notion of philosophy. Indeed, implementation or utilization of 
philosophy as a tool runs contrary, for Rancière, to the value of emancipation.  
 This concern also maps on to differing views in CPI literature regarding the 
purpose and potential use-value of philosophy within schools: whether the value is 
inherent to the method or to the ‘products’ of the method.220 There is a range of reported 
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benefits to doing CPI. For example, some theorists highlight the cognitive virtues CPI may 
promote.221 It has also been argued that it supports student freedom or autonomy.222 Some 
argue that the value of CPI comes from the fact that it is radical or subversive.223 Treating 
philosophy as instrumental for other such ends is certainly found throughout CPI 
scholarship, but not all advocates take this approach.224 Nancy Vansieleghem and David 
Kennedy explain that in what they are stipulating as the “second generation” of philosophy 
for children practitioners, the earlier notion of using CPI as a tool to sharpen thinking skills 
is too similar to the tendency in traditional schooling to instrumentalize learning; CPI 
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ought not be seen as instrumental to some other end that is predetermined, but ought to 
arise within the community itself.225  
If Rancière and many CPI practitioners caution against instrumental uses for 
philosophizing, yet Rancière and CPI practitioners both seem to believe that schools can be 
improved, what is (or should be) the relationship between philosophy and schools? It has 
been argued that CPI and Rancière’s icon of the ignorant schoolmaster compel us to be 
inventive in schools – using the context in such a way as to allow novelty to emerge.226 
This may be treating the space as a kind of tool, and maybe philosophy too, but not for a 
set end. Speaking again of the evolving “generations” of approaches to philosophy for 
children, CPI being one practice among others, Vansieleghem and Kennedy explain that: 
Speculations about methods and approaches tend to be contextualized to particular 
communities, and the only broad consensus that does exist is that philosophy for 
children is about promoting the exchange of rational argument and thoughtful 
opinion. There is, however, no longer understood to be one best way of reasoning, 
for collective reason, it is held, is shaped and articulated by the social community 
in which it operates. Now philosophy for children becomes philosophy with 
children. The change in the preposition is an important index of difference: it 
betokens a still greater emphasis on dialogue as fundamental and indispensable to 
the pedagogy of philosophy, which is no longer understood as the modeling and 
coaching of an ideal of analytical reason, but as what generates communal 
reflection, contemplation and communication. In this respect, the second generation 
will no longer speak about philosophy for or with children in terms of a method, 
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but rather as a movement encompassing a medley of approaches, each with its own 
methods, techniques and strategies.227 
 
Perhaps when looking at CPI as a movement, and indeed as a movement in which there are 
emergent assertions and creative responses rather than dogmatic methods, the 
compatibility with Rancière is quite cogent. Gert Biesta argues that often in CPI, where 
philosophy is being used in an educational setting, it seems to be treated as an instrument 
to ‘develop better humans.’228 What we ought to do, he argues, is use it to help expose 
ourselves, and our students, to our ignorance, to the part of ourselves that has a unique 
perspective and intelligence. In this way, he says, philosophy in schools can be an 
interruption rather than a developmental step or instrument toward producing some end.229 
Kohan and Hayes have even suggested that the ignorant schoolmaster and the CPI 
facilitator are indeed “difficultating,” rather than facilitating because the facilitator 
problematizes assumptions, inferences, and so forth.230 Interruption, or difficultating, is 
quite analogous to dissensus.  
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Universal teaching may not share the same ends as that of CPI, which for many is 
to reach the most reasonable conclusion or response. If we simply take the Jacototian 
method from The Ignorant Schoolmaster, there are limited results we may aim for (i.e. 
translating the Telemaque).231 However, readers who consider other Rancièrian works tend 
to take him to be advocating for a more open-ended approach to education.232 For 
Rancière, the only necessary component, it seems, would be the assumption of an equality 
of intelligence; no particular end is important. He writes of the student:  
He doesn’t necessarily find what he was looking for, and even less what he was 
supposed to find. But he finds something new to relate to the thing that he already 
knows. What is essential is the continuous vigilance, the attention that never 
subsides without irrationality setting in.233 
 
For practitioners of CPI it is not the case that in an inquiry “anything goes,” for there are 
procedures pertaining to participation and respect that must be followed, and there must an 
earnest effort to co-construct knowledge.234 Yet, parameters can be deemed as necessary 
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within the Rancièrian picture too, for there is a need for holding a task in common just as 
there is a need for some force to inspire, push, or sustain one’s will. In CPI, while there is 
an attempt to “arrive at one or more reasonable judgments regarding their own questions,” 
there are also scholars who argue that this need not entail a linear or teleological trajectory, 
and that this reasonable answer is not predetermined or set in stone; what is most 
reasonable could change from moment to moment.235 As Kennedy writes of a CPI 
dialogue: 
It is a chaotic structure, a continuously emergent, open system, whose direction can 
never be overdetermined. Freeze-framed at any given moment, it contains a 
multiplicity of possible directions in which it could move forward, which depend to 
a great extent on the individuals participating in the communal dialogue.236 
The epistemology behind both this selection and the pervasive treatment of the notion of 
truth within CPI literature are certainly reminiscent of Pragmatism, from which the 
practice draws inspiration. Much like Rancière’s conception of truth, where it is underlying 
and ineffable, so too does CPI have some element of assuming a kind of unifying, shared 
experience, the value of which serves as a kind of truth.237 Participants in a CPI can share 
their own experiences or create hypotheticals to demonstrate their understanding of, or 
resistance to, a proposed position or concept. There are thus emergent, creative assertions 
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that bring value to the group and ultimately disrupt moments of seeming consensus. Shared 
meanings, voiced understanding, and articulated thoughts can serve as a kind of communal 
truth, but this is secondary to the underlying assumption of the value of each community 
member. That which is created by each community member takes precedence over the 
notion of an objective kind of fact that is discoverable and separate from the lived 
experiences of the community members. 
 There are thus overlaps between the values of egalitarianism, assertion, and 
creativity within both Rancière and CPI’s conception of philosophy. These values, a 
response to the problematic elitism, method, and truth arguably found in traditional 
philosophy, are important when considering whether philosophy can or should transpire in 
K-12 schools. Both Rancière and CPI have strengths and weaknesses, in my view, when 
analyzing schooling and philosophy. By bringing them together their respective fields of 
study can be invigorated, and those of us interested in bringing philosophy to schools can 
be constructively provoked.  
 
Conclusion 
For Rancière, schools will never be exempt from the problems that inspire and 
demand philosophical destabilizing, no matter how utopic the schools are, and no matter 
what methods or ‘un-methods’ we enforce within them. We see Rancière acknowledge the 
form of the school as a temporal break from the rest of society, thus conducive to the 
forging of new possibilities, yet we also see him admonish the explicative order of schools 
in the Ignorant Schoolmaster. Despite all his critiques, Rancière suggests that schools can 
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be better. These better schools, though, will always lie apart from what real philosophy is 
doing. Ultimately, Rancière wants to preserve the skepticism toward all social institutions, 
even those formed spontaneously within a CPI. In other words, while dialogue itself takes 
on a value in CPI, in Rancière’s picture it is dissensus that has value. In each of these, it 
seems to fit that philosophy is focused on contestable concepts.238 Further, participants in 
this conversation are each inherently equipped to contest such concepts. “Little p” 
philosophy allows us to refocus our relationship to truth at any moment. While Rancière is 
not suggesting that this is something that must be taught (for indeed, it is arguably a 
realization or level of awareness that is always possible), talking about it in school may 
offer support to those who are doubtful about the realization they have had. CPI may thus 
give students the confidence to do this philosophizing both inside and outside of school, 
but it should not be viewed as the means by which they are able to do this philosophizing 
in the first place. What we choose to call this in schools will never change the fact that 
Rancièrian, “little p,” dissensual philosophizing, is in direct contrast to schooling itself.  
Maughn Gregory and David Granger argue that there are central questions within 
the philosophy in schools movement: 1) whether children can practice philosophy 2) 
whether (and why) they should be invited and guided to do so, and, 3) assuming positive 
responses to the first two, how this should happen.239 The similarities I have elaborated on 
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in this chapter, between Rancière’s critiques and norms around schooling and philosophy 
and those found in CPI, should assure us that both Rancière and CPI would answer the 
above questions in a similar way. Anyone can practice philosophy, because philosophy has 
nothing to do with intelligence or status but is, rather, an orientation. Students in K-12 
schools should be able to philosophize in schools, and it would be great if they could; 
given the problematic elements of schools, philosophizing in schools would be 
empowering, emancipatory. However, authentic philosophizing cannot be forced or 
guaranteed, even with the good intention of coming to schools with a philosophical 
method.  
 CPI is a response to traditional schooling practices to the extent that traditional 
schools maintain inequality through stultification, assume objective truth that requires 
explanation, and are wed to progress and the police order. CPI is a response to traditional 
philosophy to the extent that traditional philosophy is elitist, assumes a method that 
alienates lived experiences, and is predicated on singular objectivity. The norms put forth 
or assumed within CPI are compatible with Rancière’s norms. As I have argued in this 
chapter, there is an extent to which CPI assumes equality of intelligence, believes in the 
separation between language and truth, and values egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity.  
 Dissensus is a pervasive value for Rancière and CPI. This chapter has argued that, 
granting Rancière’s critiques and norms regarding schooling and philosophy, we might 
have good reason to practice CPI in schools. I hypothesize that CPI may be our best bet for 
supporting dissensus in schools. Even Kohan, a proponent of CPI and a reader of Rancière, 
asks the question, “Is the experience of philosophy possible in an institution, like the 
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school, which is overwhelmed by a determinative order?”240 In keeping with this spirit of 
skepticism, let us proceed to test my hypothesis; in the next chapter of this dissertation I 
theorize the application of CPI to schools. 
  
                                                     






THE POSSIBILITY OF PHILOSOPHY IN SCHOOLS  
 
In the previous chapter I argued that if we accept the critiques of schooling and 
philosophy and corresponding values shared by Rancière and community of philosophical 
inquiry (CPI), we have good reason to use CPI in traditional schools. However, there are 
limitations to bringing the practice into such schools, and CPI should not be treated as a 
cure-all. In this chapter I consider how the critiques and norms of schooling and 
philosophy support both creating new schools modeled wholly on CPI and bringing CPI 
into traditional schools. Although each approach ends up mirroring some of the very 
tendencies in schooling and philosophy that they are meant to combat, I contend that 
utilizing CPI in these ways is the best way to embody the values I have argued are shared 
by Rancière and CPI. 
Whether in schools or not, a noteworthy component of CPI according to some 
advocates is possibility. Indeed, this is essential to education: that life is not fated, that 
something can be learned, that a life can be changed. Possibility is a basic premise of 
schooling, and its existence is the only way to distinguish compulsory schooling from 
overt indoctrination. Students can respond to content and instruction in different ways, and 
many outcomes are possible. The chapter thus also explores the verbiage of possibility 
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within CPI literature in the hopes of reflecting on how Rancière might further inform the 
question of whether philosophy is possible in schools. 
Ultimately, this project aims to use Rancière to think through the possibility of 
philosophy in schools despite his strong warnings against both philosophy and schooling. 
This project presupposes that better schools and better schooling practices are possible, 
presupposes that it is possible to use Rancière to inform CPI. In the first section of this 
chapter, “Practical Possibilities,” I review the idea of schools based wholly on CPI as well 
as the idea of introducing CPI into existing, traditional schools. 241 Returning to the driving 
question of this dissertation, in this second section of this chapter, “Conceptual 
Possibilities,” I describe the ways in which the notion of possibility informs both 
approaches to CPI implementation.  
In the introduction of this dissertation I asked: How might the articulation of a 
positive Rancièrean conception of philosophy help in understanding what is at stake in 
practicing CPI in U.S. K-12 schools? Ultimately, the conception of philosophy I have 
worked on illuminating in this dissertation does not have a purpose in the way that must be 
justified when it goes into an existing traditional school, or even when it founds new 
schools. It is not ends-oriented. CPI entails the assumptions that Rancière argues we should 
have, embodying the values he thinks philosophy should have. While it entails the values 
of egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity, these are all based on what is possible – what is 
assumed, not measured nor articulated. Rancière holds that real political moments or 
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emancipation occur as ruptures in the police order – spontaneously and without method, or 
not at all. CPI inquirers, exemplifying an appreciation for this kind of spontaneity, allow 
for the community itself to establish the questions prompting each inquiry, and to follow 
the inquiry where it leads.242 So how can a practical question about this be answered, or 
even asked?  
Before considering how it might be practically possible to implement CPI in 
schools, a small disclaimer is in order: it is important to acknowledge that this is a venture 
Rancière would not wholeheartedly endorse. Pelletier warns about applying Rancièrean-
inspired notions to educational settings because there are two ways in which he is not 
concerned with communities (and analogously, learning communities or schools). Firstly, 
Pelletier argues, Rancière is not worried about making schools do a better job of assessing 
skills and determining appropriate social roles, because he rejects the idea that there is any 
necessary relationship between social function and capacity. Social roles, specialization, 
and the distribution of power that they entail are understood as arbitrary, constructed, and 
designated in order to accomplish collective ends. Thus, if we think that we can use 
Rancière to develop schools that administer career-placement tests more successfully, or 
that develop ‘better citizens,’ we are mistaken. Secondly, Pelletier argues, Rancière is not 
concerned with helping those who suffer because of how their community (or school, or 
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society) is ordered.  Schools are part of what Rancière calls the archipolitical apparatus, 
insofar as they merely serve to explain and thus justify socio-economic inequality.243 I 
ventured to use Rancière for this project because of this strong skepticism, but it is 
important to acknowledge that the aim of using Rancière to conduct a pedagogical practice 
does involve some contradiction.   
 
Practical Possibilities 
If we agree with the critiques of schooling and philosophy I attributed to Rancière 
in Chapters Two and Three, we could argue that philosophy should exist in schools, and 
that the best form of it would be CPI.244 By way of reminder, the conception of schooling 
that I have argued is found in both Rancière and CPI is based on critiques of inequality, 
stultification, truth, explanation, progress, and the police order. Traditional schooling 
entails these problems to varying degrees because it is predicated on students progressing 
through ranked grades under supervision of teachers and administrators, obliged to 
demonstrate their understanding of discrete bodies of knowledge so as to earn diplomas 
and grades that determine their ability to receive training for, or acceptance into, various 
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roles (i.e. careers) within society. Challenging these assumptions of traditional schooling 
involves a different ethical, epistemological, and methodological orientation. Hence, the 
alternative values pertaining to schooling I have drawn out are the assumption of equality 
of intelligence, a belief in the separation between language and truth, and the value of 
dissensus. The alternative conception of philosophy shared by both Rancière and CPI 
advocates that I have elucidated over the last four chapters includes the values of 
egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity, which are in direct contrast with the elitism, 
method, and truth found in traditional philosophy. Some questions remain: does it matter 
what kind of school CPI is implemented in? Tactically, is there an order of priority that 
should be followed? 
 
Community of Philosophical Inquiry in New Schools 
Some authors within CPI literature have theorized whole-school models based on 
critiques and values common to Rancière and CPI and have problematized cases where 
philosophy is merely brought into traditional schools. In this section I focus on David 
Kennedy, whose body of literature, though without explicit reference to Rancière, betrays 
some of Rancière’s radical commitments.245 I highlight ideas put forth by Kennedy in this 
section in order to think through ways that a school based on CPI might align with 
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Rancière, as well as ways such a school may still be problematic from a Rancièrian 
perspective.  
I have drawn upon Rancière in this project precisely because he is so critical of 
schools as social institutions. He insists that if we take equality as our end in schools, we 
are attributing to schools “the fantasmatic power of realizing social equality, or at least, of 
reducing ‘social fragmentation.’”246 If we are starting out with inequality, aiming for 
equality, we are doomed. CPI allows us to start from an assumption of equality, and indeed 
thrives on dissensus. A school based on this practice would seem, at least in theory, to 
structurally avoid the problem of aiming for equality.  
Kennedy and Rancière agree on the role of schools in society, each describing 
school as a central way in which the police order is reinforced. Kennedy describes the 
school as:  
a site where the adult-child relation is regularized, formalized, fitted for the 
construction of relations of authority in the wider adult world - the “workplace,” 
the “moneyplace,” and the “policyplace.” It is in school where a process secondary 
to family socialization but equally powerful is initiated. Here the desires, the 
aspirations, the prohibitions, the fatalisms, the boundaries, and even the 
transgressive dreams of the modal adult - the adult with certain commonly shared 
tastes, aspirations, and expectations - are instilled and enforced in hegemonic form 
as discourses, dispositions, beliefs, and practices.247  
 
As I described in Chapter Two, Rancière takes schools to be prime examples of the police 
order where, just as Kennedy describes above, students learn the ways in which they fit. A 
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school constituted by CPI could theoretically help mitigate this problem, insofar as the 
practice can include students asserting different viewpoints that challenge prescribed roles, 
as well as scrutiny of terms and definitions. CPI can indeed challenge the police order that 
pervades within a group. However, how might a CPI-based school push back against the 
overall premise of schooling, which is still part of the larger police order?  In a traditional 
school one is said to move through classes, grades, and so on. How does a CPI-based 
school differ from this, if at all, on a structural level? Even if the school allows for a 
reprieve from the police order that obtains in the rest of society, it may still ultimately 
function as part of the larger social police order.  
To consider how these questions might be answered, I will describe in more detail 
Kennedy’s suggestion for a CPI-based school. Again, Kennedy does not explicitly connect 
his suggestions to Rancière, so I provide what I take to be the corresponding values in 
Rancière (which I have argued are also in CPI). Kennedy argues that the whole school 
should essentially be a CPI, and that there are four different criteria that ought to be 
followed in such a school.248 I will briefly cover each of these criteria put forth by 
Kennedy and suggest how they align with the values that, I have argued, are found in 
Rancière.  
Firstly, Kennedy asserts that such a school would entail “a hermeneutical approach 
to self and other, that is, the recognition and acceptance of distance and relation in 
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dialectical process.”249 This aligns with the belief in the separation between language and 
truth because the distance between self and other, and the dialogue required for navigating 
this distance, are respected. Secondly, a CPI school would be premised on “the affirmation 
of the other as the “single one,” which is identified with alterity, or the decentered 
psychological organization associated with “the rupture of the egoist-I.”250 This is 
analogous to the assumption of an equality of intelligence – particularly the singular, 
unitary nature of intelligence – and represents the value of egalitarianism insofar as it 
grants that the other, while distinct and different, is just as distinct and different as oneself. 
Thirdly, this school would also have “an emphasis on noninstrumental relations, which in 
this case imply a meticulous respect for an attention to the perceptions, interests, and goals 
of childhood and of individual children.”251 This third criterion reflects the critique of 
progress and the values of dissensus and creativity, for it is concerned with unique 
perspectives of every participant rather than a pre-determined end. Lastly, Kennedy argues 
that a CPI school would engage in: 
continuous attention to equitable relations of power, which implies political 
autonomy and self-governance, both within the school – which includes the 
classroom itself – and in the school’s relation to larger associations of which it may 
be a part.252  
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This fourth criterion is comparable to egalitarianism again, along with the value of 
assertion, and the critiques of elitism and the police order, for it keeps the power within 
reach of all members of the school.253  
Applying our conception of philosophy to an entire school may be substantively 
and structurally different because it would not be like a value-added model, nor would it be 
beholden to the criteria by which the school is already organized. Making whole, 
sustainable schools based on CPI might appease, in some form, the worry expressed by 
Walter Kohan that the method simply inserted into a school is “a subtle way of producing 
and stimulating some superficial or formal changes so that the fundamental structures may 
be preserved.”254 Yet even Kohan will insist that “there is no objective or impartial 
education” – a position with which Rancière would surely agree.255 Rancière insists that 
his works are not meant as an offering up of a new pedagogy, nor an anti-pedagogy. He 
argues that in his ideal of the ignorant schoolmaster, for example, he is not offering: 
an educational idea that one could apply to systemic school reform. The virtue of 
ignorance is first of all a virtue of dissociation. By asking us to dissociate teaching 
from knowledge, such a virtue, such a quality, precludes itself from ever being the 
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principle of any institution where teaching and knowledge would come into 
harmony in order to optimize the social functioning of an institution.256 
 
There is indeed a tension between Kennedy’s more utopic vision of an intentional school 
and Rancière’s admonishment of any utopic vision coinciding with social institutions (as 
radical as they may be); where there is anything social, for Rancière, there is the police 
order. A school like this would thus still need to be scrutinized and changed by all 
members as needed.  
CPI helps us to avoid the inequality and stultification found in traditional schools, 
and to combat the reified notion of truth and the elitism for which traditional philosophy is 
criticized. There is some risk that to justify the creation of CPI schools to the general 
public there could be an over-dependence on the method of CPI, and of course there would 
be some explanation of the practice required. There may be some risk that in arguing for 
the creation of these schools, there is a projection of society ‘progressing’ as a result. There 
is a risk that the creators of such a school would come across as elitist as compared to 
those who are not part of the school, particularly when administering requirements such as 
official CPI training for all teachers in the school.  
Overall, the benefit of making a purely CPI school would be more pervasive if it 
were a self-sufficient school, and it seems that this would be a noble pursuit. One line of 
discussion within Kennedy’s works is regarding the democratic sensibilities that CPI 
supports. Kennedy has described the whole-school model of CPI as an intentional 
community, “conceived normatively by definition – that is, it is both experimental and 
                                                     




emergent and guided by normative ideals; it is not a community that “just happens,” nor is 
it a community that is determined from above, by a hierarchy of power.”257 When adults 
and children within a school are in equal dialogue, learning from one another as part of an 
“intergenerational intentional community” or “adult-child collective,” Kennedy argues, 
then egalitarianism pervades the school.258 The whole-school approach gestured toward by 
Kennedy also entails valuation for democracy, and for protecting the school in its role in 
cultivating democratic citizens by engaging in authentic democratic practices in the 
classroom and throughout the school itself. Kennedy and Kohan write that CPI replaces 
“the echo chamber of the solitary thinker, connects philosophy, not just with 
epistemological and ethical transformation, but with authentic democratic practice.”259 
Kennedy also refers to CPI as “deep democratic practice.”260 He sees each school, 
provided it is set up properly, as a “powerful performative and experimental zone” as 
allowing for “shared, participatory governance.”261 Now, it might be true that dialogue is a 
skill useful in the form of democracy, but if one is sympathetic to Rancière’s critiques of 
formal democracy, then portraying dialogue as a method supportive of formal democracy 
is problematic. It may not be that such prizing of democracy entails all of the critiques of 
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schooling and philosophy reviewed thus far, but it could be construed as a fixation on both 
method and progress.  
It seems to be the case that one is limited with respect to how prescriptively a new 
CPI school can be described, given that prescription itself may foreclose too much in the 
way of creativity, assertion, and egalitarianism. Participants in a new, Rancière-inspired 
CPI school ought to be engaged together in designing their own school-community. One 
might ask whether CPI would be used for every activity within this kind of school, whether 
there would still be discrete classes centered on disciplines, and whether philosophy itself 
would be a class (assuming there are classes). Rancière inspires an appreciation for the 
way in which engaging with others in community can challenge ones will in a positive 
way. Deciding on the practical details of a school could indeed be a collective challenge 
informed by care for each individual, a respect for the Other (to the extent that this care is 
possible). The process of collectively organizing a school based on CPI could be guided by 
the principles I have argued CPI shares in common with Rancière regarding schooling and 
philosophy. The collective school would keep such principles at the core of its inquiry, 
ever orbiting around the principles upon which it is inspired, yet never fixated on one 
particular demonstration of them.  
As a further consideration, independent schools that exist outside traditional public 
schools are often populated by students of parents who have the social capital required to 
purposely send their students to a special school: such parents are knowledgeable about 
alternative options and can afford to pay for any extra costs involved. Such students 
already have a kind of privilege for this reason, as they have parents that care in some way. 
122 
 
In forming the type of school described in this section, it seems it would be quite important 
for the process to entail outreach to students who are not currently being helped within 
public schools, or to find some other way to mitigate this risk of elitism. Again, how this 
would happen without replicating various ills of schooling and philosophy may prove to be 
difficult. For example, recruiting such students might require some kind of explication as 
to how a CPI school will be better, will help the students or community progress, and so 
on.  
As I have drawn out in this section, there are benefits to creating wholly-CPI 
schools if adopting Rancière’s views, yet there are also potential problems. There is more 
to be explored in this arena, given that this thesis does not delve into different models of 
radical schools. While it would be a worthwhile scholarly endeavor to explore various 
existing models of radically different schools in order to show where Rancière and CPI 
might align with such examples, it still seems to be the case that some of the details of 
these future, ideal schools need to be ambiguous in principle – only formed in the present, 
when they are brought into existence in community. What I have done in this section is to 
offer a start regarding how one might consider applying and problematizing Rancière and 
CPI in forming new schools. In order not to be exclusive with respect to methods and 
applications, in the section that follows I consider the alternative approach of bringing CPI 






Community of Philosophical Inquiry in Existing Schools 
There are functionalist reasons for inserting CPI into schools as they exist, despite 
the problems inherent in schooling. Even if the ultimate goal were to create schools based 
entirely on CPI, bringing CPI to existing schools can serve as an experimental practice, 
enabling practitioners to discern various considerations that would not be possible to 
discern if merely theorizing about CPI in schools. If we are concerned with helping as 
many students as possible, bringing CPI to existing schools until a more ideal scenario of 
newly created schools can reach fruition could ultimately impact more students. Even 
without the end goal of creating new schools, one might take a utilitarian view and argue 
that helping more students is better, so CPI should be rolled out on a large scale in as many 
public school districts as possible. It is arguably less expensive and time-consuming to 
insert a few CPI sessions in schools rather than to build everything from the ground up. 
Contemporary literature offers examples of how to integrate philosophy into 
schools, including descriptions of lesson plans, or offers descriptions of formal and 
informal studies showing the impact of dialogue in the classroom so as to bolster efforts to 
increase the practice.262 It is important to have data to show the impacts of bringing 
philosophy into schools so that, among other reasons, teachers can implement the practice, 
funds are provided for research into the benefits of the practice, and philosophers of 
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education can support the study of CPI within academia.263 Without empirical data and 
justifications, administrators, teachers, parents, and students may not accept the novelty of 
CPI. If we want philosophy to be adopted in schools, it is necessary to show the results 
philosophy can be expected to have if it is to be adopted. Providing lesson plans is another 
practical way to help the practice flourish and can help teachers serve as facilitators of CPI 
even if they have not been formally trained or have not studied philosophy. 
Unfortunately, inputting the practice into traditional schools means that it can still 
be usurped to justify inequality, may still be delivered in a stultifying fashion, is shrouded 
in language of truth and explanation, and does not deliberately challenge the trajectory of 
progress nor the norms of the police order in a traditional school. A CPI session within the 
confines of the school day may challenge these notions during the session itself and may 
indeed inspire thought or action outside the school, but the school day is still presumed to 
continue as expected at the end of each session. Students leave the classroom and may 
need to ignore everything they thought about during a CPI session in order to succeed in 
their test-prep courses or to make decisions about which academic path will provide the 
most lucrative or even manageable financial future. Inserting CPI into traditional schools 
may keep us beholden to the aims of schooling itself. Once in a school, even with the best 
intentions, there is naturally a limit to how much a group of inquirers within a classroom 
can question the schooling process itself while inside a school. This is unacceptable from 
                                                     
263. For an example of data provided to support the acceptance of community of 
philosophical inquiry in schools see Alina Reznitskaya and Ian A. G. Wilkinson. The most 
Reasonable Answer: Helping Students Build Better Arguments Together. Harvard 
Education Press, Boston: Harvard Education Press, 2017. 
125 
 
the Rancièrian perspective, and the concern is echoed in the CPI literature as well. As 
Storme and Vlieghe note, “philosophy for/with children is (…) subservient to the existing 
regime.”264 This is because even if we do CPI in a classroom, we are still wed to the other 
things that are happening outside the school – in the school district and in society at large. 
In this sense, it can be argued that the inquiry is not all that authentic. This may seem to be 
a cynical concern but is cogent if CPI is treated as a discrete subject in school. Even if CPI 
promotes transferrable skills, the issue of what these skills are applied to is of concern. 
As a further point, promoting the instrumentality of CPI may contradict and 
perhaps counteract the non-instrumental value of the practice. As Storme and Vlighe note: 
The currently hard-felt need to define philosophical activity as a useful activity - in 
its content, its methods, or its objectives - jeopardizes the very potentiality that 
characterizes philosophy.265  
 
Potentiality and creativity may be facets of philosophy, but they are difficult to articulate 
when educators are asked to justify their time spent with specific methods for delivery of 
specific educational values.266 Further, presenting philosophy as something that provides 
for possibility or novelty, as I will discuss further in the following section, returns us to the 
issue of all things needing to have some place, purpose, function, or demonstration.  
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Portraying philosophy as a feature that can be added to current schools to enhance and 
enhance our citizenship also detracts from the critique of compulsory education and its 
implicit obsession with progress – an issue Rancière challenges us to acknowledge.  
An aspect of the philosophical conception that has taken shape over the past four 
chapters is indeed in conflict with an instrumental approach to philosophy in schools, and 
much of the language used when framing its use-value distorts the real value of this type of 
philosophy. As Storme and Vlieghe write: 
this definition of philosophical practice, as the cultivation of critical thinking skills, 
turns these skills into competences to acquire, and thereby seems to undermine 
neotenic openness and to make it subservient to a regime of thought that is not its 
own creation.267 
 
Framing philosophy as having a use-value that maps on to standards of intelligence and 
success already existing in our culture forces us to buy into the problems exposed by 
Rancière and CPI literature. Defining philosophy as having a kind of use value is 
problematic if the real value is not a kind of usefulness, measurability, or demonstration.268 
Making this case in an even stronger way, Kennedy argues that genuine dialogue cannot 
even happen if the relationship is premised on some kind of instrumentalism.269 Having an 
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end in sight for dialogue means that at least one interlocutor is not going into the dialogue 
with the possibility of changing their mind nor even altering their conception of the 
relevant driving question in the inquiry. In this way, Kennedy offers, the dialogue is not 
genuine. 
When working to justify the aims of philosophy in schools one must be cognizant 
of potentially replicating the problematic forms of philosophy and the problematic notions 
associated with schooling. Philosophy in schools has been depicted as a unique practice 
that no other subject in schools is offering, a way to help university philosophy 
departments, and as a set of skills useful for other disciplines.270 Sometimes philosophy 
thus comes into schools as a way of propping up the problematic elitism of traditional 
philosophers and indeed the academic field of which they are a part. 
I am not denying that there are benefits of engaging in CPI in K-12 schools, and I 
am indeed an avid supporter of any way that we can introduce philosophy into schools. I 
have several times been a judge and organizer for the National High School Ethics Bowl, 
which may be the farthest from Rancière’s views as you can get. As a reminder, I am using 
Rancière as a foil to problematize (and perhaps strengthen or give up) my dream of a 
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philosophy-based high school. Having studied philosophy as an undergraduate and 
graduate student, convinced that my struggles in high school may have been assuaged had 
I been recognized for the philosophical questions I was grappling with as a teen, I tend to 
believe that even just handing a high school student a Platonic dialogue will add some 
good to the world. My inclination is to do whatever it takes to expose more students to 
philosophical inquiry, regardless of the form – even if it is a photocopy of an ancient Greek 
dialogue. If the way to do this is to make a case for the importance of learning humanistic 
foundations, I am not opposed to this strategy. However, if we are considering these tactics 
in light of some of the fundamental principles that I argue are implied in both CPI and 
Rancière, there is more to be considered. 
To get philosophy into schools we need to pitch its functional dimension. 
Arguably, one could emphasize certain more marketable benefits of doing CPI, even if the 
real objective of the practice entails providing a space where there is no end-game and no 
ulterior purpose. Indeed, this is the approach I tend to take, supporting any and all efforts 
to bring philosophy and CPI into schools, even though I want to change them. Indeed, it 
might be the case that Vansieleghem and Kennedy are right when they assert that CPI, 
with its inherently subversive quality, “represents a sort of Trojan Horse wheeled into the 
ideological state apparatus of Western schooling.”271 Bringing CPI into schools is a way to 
make philosophy – of the quite radical type – possible in schools. 
 
                                                     





School as a Place for Possibility 
Kennedy reminds us that traditional schools will always be places of struggle 
between adults and children – two cultures, caught in a relation of power.272 His answer to 
this is to acknowledge this power relation within schools and to ultimately protect youth 
from the outside world by preserving space for the novelty they will inevitably produce 
within the school, particularly in CPI sessions. This dialogue allows for “reconstruction of 
epistemological and ontological convictions that better match an emergent future.”273 It is 
novelty that is the underlying value, rather than adherence to what already exists.  
Similarly, Jan Masschelein and Maarten Simons call attention to a positive 
characterization of the school that Rancière has offered, wherein school is a form of 
equalization insofar as the space of a school offers students a temporal break from the 
inequities they experience in their lives outside.274 By conceiving of the school’s form 
rather than content, Masschelein and Simons align themselves with what may be an ideal 
that we can derive from Pelletier’s interpretation: Rancière is not advocating for schools as 
places where social harmony can become manifest, but instead, as places where we can 
challenge the very aim of social harmony.275 For Rancière, democratic acts are emergent, 
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excessive ruptures that break from the way we perceive the world (the distribution/partition 
of the sensible), and schools for Rancière are thus just as conducive to these moments as 
other places.276 
Kennedy and the subset of radical thinkers found in the intersection between 
Rancière and CPI propose alternative conceptions of schools wherein true possibility is 
protected and nurtured when it emerges.277 This position holds that in such a school, or 
intentional community, students are not burdened with the material economy, hence 
serving a unique function in society. Schools may reflect some problematic features of 
society, but they also serve as a space apart from society, and maintaining this space is 
important if we want youth to be able to truly imagine a different world and make 
changes.278  
As with some advocates of CPI, Rancière warns that we ought not expect for 
schools to be free of stultification, or the other problems inherent in schooling, for schools 
are part of the police order. However, Rancière reminds us that his critique of institutions 
is not based on an ideal of a stateless society free of all institutions, for he says that there 
are still good things made possible through institutions in terms of realizing personal and 
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social capacities.279 His insistence is that we should not assume that equality is an end that 
can be achieved via the state or some alternative to it, but rather that equality is continually 
enacted through our assumptions. As Rancière puts it, “intellectual emancipation is 
necessarily distinct from social and institutional logic. That is to say that there is no social 
emancipation, and no emancipatory school.”280 A practitioner of CPI who is informed by 
Rancière acknowledges the messiness of social institutions, but decides not to profess to be 
contributing to a social institution that miraculously represents knowledge and truth, nor to 
judge who is more deserving of having their basic necessities met, nor to lead in a struggle 
for social harmony. Administrators who are informed by CPI may grant more autonomy to 
teachers, for they can assume an equality of intelligence on the part of their teaching staff. 
Rancière can help with the tendency of those working to bring philosophy into 
schools to embrace methodological purity. CPI practitioners can learn from Rancière that if 
they are worried about the elitism of philosophy they should also worry about the elitism 
of their methods. What should philosophical pedagogy look like? What books or prompts 
should be used to spark philosophical dialogue? Who counts as a qualified CPI facilitator? 
What kind of assessment should be used for CPI? These are all questions that assume that 
we can continue refining our practices, and take different stances on the answers to these 
questions. There may be better and worse ways of accomplishing certain ends, but 
Rancière offers a reminder for those who find themselves becoming dogmatic in their 
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approach to philosophy in schools: there can be no science of emancipation. It may be 
necessary to insist on certain parameters, set up metrics and methods, cite the benefits of 
critical, caring, and dialogical thinking, but the possibility that all this work is meant to 
support cannot be foreseen and will never be wholly captured. The burden of emancipation 
is largely internal, for it entails examining our own assumptions, the judgments we make 
about reality, and the expectations we set for others, for society, and for ourselves. In some 
ways, the possibility of philosophy in schools thus depends on one’s level of comfort with 
possibility itself.  
 
Conceptual Possibilities 
Although it did not start out as a term I thought important in bridging these two 
bodies of scholarship, the notion of possibility has come to weigh heavily on my mind 
while thinking through Rancière and CPI. Firstly, possibility is a presupposition of 
schooling, because education requires the potential to learn – the potential for a change to 
occur in a student. Secondly, possibility is a practical word, because one can ask whether 
philosophy of the sort considered in this dissertation is possible in schools. Finally, 
possibility seems to flavor all the critiques and values that Rancière and CPI share, for the 
dissensual philosophical dialogue is premised on an always possible disagreement – the 
possibility represented by the perspective of the Other. In the previous section I looked at 
practical considerations. This section will give a gloss on some of the elements to consider 
surrounding conceptual possibility, given all that has been covered thus far. I explain the 
notions of subjectivization and emancipation in Rancière and show how they are values 
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supported in CPI literature as well. I describe at greater length how possibility figures into 
Rancière and CPI on a conceptual level. Before ending the section I offer the caveat that 
viewing possibility as novelty, and treating this novelty as the primary value of CPI or 
schooling itself, is problematic from the Rancièrean perspective.  
 
Subjectivization and Emancipation 
Rancière proposes that real emancipation and real democracy obtain through a 
process of subjectivization – defined as “disidentification, removal from the naturalness of 
a place,” wherein, by assuming an equality of intelligence, we forgo any allegiance to the 
idea that power and intelligence are linked.281 Because this process of subjectivization is 
predicated on an emergent element and is therefore a supplement to the existing order, it 
cannot be predetermined and thus cannot be ordained from the outside – not by a teacher 
nor by any authority figure.282 The process of subjectivization “happens not in actuality but 
in spite of actuality.”283 Subjectivization precludes conformity.  
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There are many examples of subjectivization that come to mind, but an easy one is 
the recent public dialogue about transgender bodies. While gender-convention in our recent 
history has held that people are either male or female, it is now understood by at least some 
that a person can be born one way but identify in another. This kind of gender identity goes 
against physical form and is an assertion about one’s own identity, challenging the notion 
that our physical bodies have anything to do with how we should perform socially, how we 
should feel inside.   
 Emancipation obtains in emergent forms and utterances not previously expressed or 
policed.284 To put it in metaphysical terms, you are emancipated if you recognize that the 
material conditions of the world are not essential properties, and that existence could in 
theory manifest itself differently. In terms of experience, we can perceive and observe 
regardless of what situation we are in. There is the possibility to choose to be kind even in 
violent situations, or to focus on a goal even in chaos. Emancipation is the recognition that 
we can choose to not be dictated by our circumstances.  
In Buddhist terms I would argue that this understanding of emancipation is akin to 
the notion of emptiness, where the practitioner recognizes that the material world itself and 
our physical reactions to it are at root only temporary, while consciousness is a constant 
that has no essential nature. 285 The way things appear, the way we perceive things, says 
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nothing about any objective reality that exists. Emancipation is a break with what exists, a 
true mark of freedom. To be emancipated is to defy what is, to acknowledge the apparent 
facts and to choose otherwise. It may seem that this is blatant naivety or evidence of 
privilege, for surely one can much more comfortably “ignore facts” if they have plenty to 
eat, a secure home, and the other material conditions that make life safe.286 In part, my 
response to this would be that attention to the transitivity of material circumstances, or to 
the constant threat of change and impermanence, can be a helpful reminder even for those 
who may be too comfortable: you can always choose how you react to change. On the 
other hand, I feel that this notion of emancipating oneself could be inappropriately 
prescribed as a remedy for social injustice that deserves correction; problems are not 
always caused by individuals nor can they always be fixed by way of personal meditation 
or reflection.287  
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mitigating discrepancies see Hallward, “Subversion of Mastery,” 39-43. 
 
287. There is worry in the literature that Rancière’s entire argument amounts to a 
suggestion to make an attitudinal shift but is not helpful in making actual changes to 
exploitative institutions and economies nor in addressing strategies and affect intrinsic in 
the (dis)sensual politics he promotes. See Davis, “The Radical Pedagogies,” 188-189; Alex 
Means, “Aesthetics, Affect, And Educational Politics,” Educational Philosophy & Theory, 




Rather than acting on the assumption that schooling effectively recognizes and 
sorts intelligence in order to justify oppression across social stations or to substantiate 
socioeconomic disparities and hierarchies, emancipation entails awareness that social roles 
are contracts that do not signify essential differences or intellectual merits. Emancipation 
thus aligns with a presupposition regarding the value of egalitarianism.288 Subjectivization 
“verifies equality” because it demonstrates one’s ability/possibility to exercise one’s will, 
and a recognition of that same force in others.289 Tyson Lewis even asserts that education 
just is subjectivation of the will.290 To be educated is thus to recognize oneself (and others) 
as learner, as one who is choosing what to take on in life, what to become, how to 
contribute to the world. Again, this could be misinterpreted as putting every burden on 
individuals, and placing blame for societal inequities on individual mindsets. Emancipation 
should be seen instead as an ideal for those in society who are in positions of relative 
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assertion, with respect to Rancière’s discussion in The Ignorant Schoolmaster. See “The 
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authority vis a vis students, and are engaged in practices intended to change both 
themselves and society in order that equality can be better enacted.  
Emancipation occurs without planning, because it is individual and sporadic. CPI 
can help the community itself to deliberately come to grips with the reality in which we are 
each imbricated as individuals grappling with representation, communication, iteration, 
and social construction of roles – each of us with an equal connection to intelligence, will, 
awareness, and each with our own haeecity.291 As Rancière writes: 
Equality is fundamental and absent, timely and untimely, always up to the initiative 
of individuals and groups who, set against the ordinary course of events, take the 
risk of verifying their equality, of inventing individual and collective forms for its 
verification. Affirmation of these simple principles in fact constitutes an 
unprecedented dissonance, a dissonance one must, in a way, forget in order to 
continue improving schools, programs and pedagogies, but that one must also, from 
time to time, listen to again so that the act of teaching does not lose sight of the 
paradoxes that give it meaning.292 
 
We need to keep our hopes in check, appreciating the authentic ways of engaging one 
another and ourselves when these moments do happen. Hearkening back to the preface of 
this dissertation and my tale of the teenager writing angrily about the wizdumb of her 
teachers and administrators, we might recognize that when a teen makes a magazine during 
school it is an opportunity. Rather than mark either the instrumentality or impediment to 
instrumentality that this zine represents with respect to graduation from high school, we 
could delve into its content as a group. The goal should not be to diminish these kinds of 
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disruptions per se, but to understand their cause, if possible, and to respond in a way that 
celebrates the process and allows for assertions of creativity that act to change the 
curriculum. Having outlined some of the background terms involved in the conceptual 
view of possibility in Rancière and CPI, I will now move on to inquiring into the value of 
possibility writ large, as well as into the potential issue of valuing it in the wrong way.  
 
Possibility and Expectations of the Other 
Rancière and CPI, at least in the sense presented by Kennedy, lead us toward 
making a space where sporadic disruptions and novel or renewed concepts emerge within a 
community. As I have tried to show, granting certain values of schooling and philosophy, 
the best technique for acknowledging power and welcoming emergent properties within 
the intentional community of any school, traditional or new, is CPI. Referring to Deleuze 
and Guattari, Storme, and Vlieghe argue that “Philosophy is exactly that practice that 
makes the experience of the new possible through the creation of concepts.”293 For Storme 
and Vlieghe, this creation of concepts is feasible only when we are, as they put it in 
Agamben’s terminology, neotenic children.294 This term is meant to serve as a contrast to 
the notion of mastery, knowledge, and essentially all that constitutes the police order for 
Rancière. As Kennedy and Kohan put it, schools can have a role in: 
                                                     
293. Storme and Vlieghe, “The Experience of Childhood and the Learning 
Society,” 24. 
 





emancipatory futurity, a role based on the ongoing historical reconstruction of the 
adult-child relation as, on one important level, a relation of equals, driven by an 
awareness of the human dimension of natality, and full of a creative, potentially 
transformative tension.295 
 
This tendency in CPI literature to focus on natality should be of no surprise given that CPI 
is premised on honoring children and their perspective.296 Possibility can easily be seen as 
a characterizing element of youth. However, there is a fine line between respecting 
possibility and expecting products, change, and outcomes as a result of this possibility. 
Indeterminacy is a major part of the value of CPI, and also of the value of 
philosophical practice implicit in Rancière’s oevre. Given this language of possibility, one 
might worry that having any coherent conception of philosophy would be foreclosing on 
possibility too much.297 Additionally, it may seem that excessively endorsing possibility 
for its own sake amounts to relativism, wherein everything (from logical statements to 
moral norms) is equally possible and plausible. However, what I argue is the most 
important concern from a Rancièrean perspective is the need to recognize possibility for 
what it is: not formed, and thus not measurable.  
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It is acknowledged in CPI literature that any proposed ways to support 
emancipation within schools cannot be overly prescriptive. For example, Lewis’ 
suggestion that laughter can be disruptive and thus political within a classroom is a 
suggestion, but not one that we can force. Bursts of laughter, as with emancipatory acts 
writ large, are not genuine when scripted. Comedy and emancipation occur in unexpected 
ways.298 We ought to treat the potential emancipation in school as merely possible – not 
guaranteed, not expected, not planned. Yet even if we prize schools as being uniquely safe 
spaces for this kind of unregulated possibility, as mentioned in the previous section, there 
is a danger that we are making schools out to be too pure, and a danger that we are making 
this possibility into something that we are expecting, that we are wanting to measure, 
represent, understand. 
Ultimately this possibility-focused philosophy ought to maintain an orientation 
toward something that is out of our control yet that we should live in a kind of accordance 
with, be it by understanding our place in relation to it or by cultivating respect for it. For 
Rancière there is a will that we all have, a truth underlying our wills, and a muddled 
divergence that manifests when we subjectivize and speak. We thus create and recreate 
difference all the time, and none of it is fixed or essential. If the Other is not essentialized, 
this is good. Rancière wants us to play around with this, to use this arbitrariness of essence 
and function to stake claims when necessary. The latter would seem to be an ethical 
                                                     




imperative, grounded in there being something at stake that is desiring of respect or 
advocacy. But what grounds it? 
The very structure that makes possibility immanent is the feature that guards 
against relativism or even nihilism: the equality of participants. This equality – not 
quantified but assumed – is a critical feature for CPI and Rancière.299 Within both CPI 
(specifically Kennedy) and Rancière there is this assumption of respect for otherness, for 
the unknown, the possible, the ineffable, for veracity and for the thou.300 Part of our 
experience – perhaps all of our material experience – cannot capture truth, cannot represent 
subjective experience. In the same way that Kennedy proposes alterity as the ground of 
learning itself, so also do Storme and Vlieghe suggest that education happens in lieu of the 
desire to be competent, to master the world.301 Although Rancière does not use the term 
alterity, I find an analogous notion in his description of his principle of veracity. According 
to this principle, truth is something with which we each have our own unique relationship, 
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and any attempts to explain this truth are inevitably fruitless.302 Rancière writes, “what, 
brings people together, what unites them, is nonaggregation.”303  
While there are commonalities, it is important to recognize what Rancière brings to 
the table among the CPI advocates who praise possibility. Jasinki and Lewis argue that CPI 
could do better at highlighting emergence, ambiguity, and immeasurability as the value of 
CPI. Language itself, they contend, is what triggers emergence, for it is the act of 
“babbling” or not being understood through language that creates novelty and freedom.304 
On my reading, Rancière represents more of a Rousseauian position wherein it is society 
itself that entails this friction or incommensurability – not language. In this way, Rancière 
preserves a deep respect for ontological otherness – other wills – rather than a prioritization 
of freedom for its own sake. We cannot be free of the Other. Whether it is the burden of 
society, the problematic philosopher king, the oppressive school district, it is there. The 
unknown or the Other can be seen as a good, perhaps with moral or ethical implications, 
and certainly is educative: our freedom comes in choosing how to respond to this Other, 
and indeed, we can choose to learn from all others and not just authorities.305 In this way, 
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305. Kennedy certainly works with Buber, but I am taking liberty in bringing such 
notions of the other and ethical imperatives into conversation with Rancière. Samir Haddad 
considers how shared learning can occur in a classroom characterized by universal 
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Rancière is not primarily focused on possibility and what kinds of novelty can emerge. Nor 
is he primarily concerned with amelioration of society. He calls on us to accept the kind of 
structures inherent in society, to accept their inevitabilities, and to recognize what kind of 
fundamentally egalitarian principles are at their root. This is a call for us each to challenge 
our fundamental assumptions about the Other amidst any and all pedagogical 
implementations, especially CPI. 
   
Conclusion 
If one endorses Rancière’s critiques of schooling and philosophy, it may be 
difficult to imagine his ideal, dissensual practice of philosophy ever being authentically 
implemented in schools. If one recognizes that CPI fits well with Rancière’s critiques and 
norms, then CPI in existing schools or informing the creation of new schools seems to be 
the most promising way of practicing philosophy in society. In this chapter I have 
reviewed some reasons for using use CPI to inform the creation of entirely new schools, as 
well as some reasons we ought to introduce the practice in existing schools. I have also 
covered some of the drawbacks of each of these endeavors. Despite the inherently 
imperfect – given the context of schooling itself – execution of CPI, its implementation in 
existing schools can challenge the way traditional schooling maintains inequality through 
stultification, the assumption of objective truth that requires explanation, and the 
promotion of progress via the police order. If used to inform the design of entirely new 
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schools, despite the fact that schools will always entail problems, CPI offers a utopic 
model for what schools could be, insofar as it is founded on an assumption of equality of 
intelligence, an acknowledgement of the separation between language and truth, and the 
values of egalitarianism, assertion, and creativity.  
The title of this dissertation refers to the possibility of philosophy in schools in 
order to provoke consideration as to why philosophy might not be possible. The formal 
structure of CPI can be set up in different kinds of schools, but the philosophy that might 
transpire will always be limited given the convention of school itself. Truly emergent, 
democratic, ‘childlike’ moments break through at random – not at the command of 
teachers or administrators. Rancière urges us to see that philosophy can happen anywhere, 
and that it cannot be premeditated or measured. A sustainable whole-school approach, I 
argue, would be better so that there is no economic, material need to acquire various skills 
in order to be able to survive once outside the school community. However, even a more 
radical, self-sufficient school would not rid itself of the problems Rancière points out, 
given the limitations of social life in general.  
Conditions can be set up to be more hospitable to emancipatory moments, more 
nurturing to its calls, but one must always be vigilant of one’s assumptions. There will 
never be a perfect solution for society, because there is always what Rancière refers to as a 
miscount: there is always a disparity between our felt, lived truth, and our socially-
dependent language, our social roles, and society in general.306 Schools are social, and in 
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some ways, philosophy happens in spite of them. CPI advocates would argue that 
philosophy is certainly possible in schools, particularly when it is viewed as a social 
project. Thus, one can learn from both Rancière and CPI that philosophy is possible in 
schools, that philosophy can, should, and certainly will happen in spite of schools. While I 
have argued that CPI is a preferable practice, the individual practitioner and the 
assumptions he or she makes have just as much to do with the possibility of philosophy 








I came to this project already believing that philosophy in any way, shape, or form 
would be a good thing in schools, given my own experience as a U.S. public high school 
student. Ultimately, the project is meant to explore and problematize this goal in order to 
either strengthen the arguments behind it or abandon it. The intent is to think through how 
I can truly help students in the way that I wish I had been helped. Is community of 
philosophical inquiry (CPI) the way to do this? Can one hold to the criticisms of schooling 
and philosophy as described in Chapters Two and Three and use CPI in new or existing 
schools without contradicting oneself? In this concluding chapter I reflect on this potential 
hypocrisy a bit more, but first I share about a recent conversation I had, to provide an 
example of why I believe this has been a valuable project. I offer some recommendations 
as to where this research could go next, as well as a reflection on the process of writing the 
dissertation itself, before summarizing the conclusions I have drawn from this project.  
 Not long ago, at a university function for work, I met an undergraduate who plans 
to be both a teacher and a counselor, and who currently works with students of parents who 
are incarcerated. Seated at a table with this student and a college provost, I was prompted 
to describe my dissertation research. After hearing my elevator pitch, the student asked me 
how I defined philosophy. I offered my definition and her reply was “doesn’t that already 
happen around the kitchen table?” The provost, also an Ethnic Studies professor and 
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former high school teacher, replied that it is ironic that Rancière critiques philosophers in 
this way, given that French philosophers are some of the most elite and powerful within 
French academia. Ultimately, the remarks by my two interlocutors indicated that the effort 
to bring philosophy into schools does indeed appear as elitist insofar as it assumes that 
people are not already philosophizing. Further, it would seem that there is some self-
contradiction involved in using academic philosophers in order to eventually argue that 
philosophy can take place outside the academy. 
Rancière warns that when philosophers try to ‘do good’ as philosophers, this is 
problematic. He boldly professes, “philosophy does not come to anyone’s rescue and no 
one asks it to.”307 If the intent is to be egalitarian, to allow for student assertions to impact 
practice, and to make space for creativity, any conception of philosophy being promoted 
must incorporate these values, and the method of implementation must not violate them. 
There is still a very real need to pinpoint the ways in which CPI challenges the problems 
inherent in traditional schooling and traditional philosophy. Granted, I did not get to fully 
defend this view, or to explain CPI to the student or the provost, but their responses can be 
seen as examples of how those interested in issues of social justice in education might react 
initially to the idea of bringing philosophy into schools. Moreover, there is a need to stay 
humble regarding the inclination to try to ‘rescue people’ with philosophy – even if the 
inclination comes from ones own experience of wanting to be rescued in this way.  
                                                     




 As already indicated in the preface, my interest in this general topic began when I 
was in high school, though it has taken many years for it to become more defined, 
informed by life experience and exposure to new ideas. I arrived at the academic discipline 
of philosophy after already having committed to making public schools better places, 
motivated by my own disappointment in school and my aspiration to contribute to social 
equity. I was committed to bringing philosophy to high schools prior to my reading of 
Rancière, yet his criticism of philosophy gave me pause. It was not difficult for me to 
decide I wanted to write on Rancière, and I had hoped even when applying to my doctoral 
program that I would be able to integrate my passion for philosophy in schools into my 
dissertation research.  
The dissertation process itself proved to be an extremely challenging undertaking. 
More than anything else, I have learned the meaning of both resilience and humility. My 
very early proposal outlines, which I drafted in 2015, were narrowed down over time until 
my topic was more manageable. Even in my final revisions of the dissertation I have had to 
become more focused, zeroing in on what I initially thought was too small a contribution. I 
went down paths of argumentation that I had to abandon, leaving off entire chapters that I 
thought at one point would figure into the thesis.  At one time I was intending to look more 
broadly at the notion of equality in education by discussing Black Lives Matter and CPI as 
two case studies on Rancièrian equality. At another I was going to challenge Rancière’s 
reading of Plato, focusing on the notions of sophrosune and ananke. At yet another, I 
intended to explore the connection between Rancière, CPI, and philosophical anarchism. 
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The topic needed to be narrowed, and I have been humbled by the challenge involved in 
sufficiently addressing even a fraction of what I had originally intended to address.  
I am not yet sure what to make of the entire process, but I believe I will need a 
period of recovery before I can consider writing anything else within academia. Further, I 
am much less confident about how much integrity one can preserve while trying to argue 
for bringing philosophy to schools. In the past two years, since defending my proposal, I 
have held a full-time job and several online adjunct teaching jobs while also somehow 
writing and editing this dissertation. Perhaps because it has been such a struggle, perhaps 
because I have been experiencing “senioritus,” perhaps because the feeling was there, 
dormant, all along, I have experienced feelings of entitlement. I have felt irritated by 
undergraduates who did not seem to respect my experience or the hard work I was putting 
into my course offerings. I have had feelings of anger at the prospect of having to continue 
to work very hard if I want to become a faculty member – reflecting the hidden assumption 
that the degree itself entitles me to any job I want. In short, I have had feelings that I did 
not expect I would have, feelings that are in direct contrast with the values that I prize in 
this project, and the values that initially drove me to pursue graduate degrees. Surely these 
feelings will diminish, but I surely hope that I can authentically use my doctorate to live 
the values described in this dissertation. Reflecting on the process, what I can say 
definitively is that the wizdumb I was preoccupied with in high school is still very much a 
concern of mine.   
 While I may not be engaging in this research myself, there are a few paths one 
might journey down if inspired to continue this inquiry. More work can be done on the 
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notion of possibility in Rancière, particularly to bolster a Rancièrian response to CPI 
advocates who believe possibility itself should be nurtured within schools. It would also be 
interesting to further explore the way in which philosophy is conceived within the 
movement to bring philosophy to U.S. K-12 schools. It would also be interesting to 
compare and contrast Rancière’s critique of democracy with arguments regarding the 
democratic sensibilities that CPI may nurture. Furthermore, there is a subtext to this entire 
project that I did not get to address, which is that philosophy within academia is a very 
white, predominately male discipline. This fact should also be addressed before objectively 
ascertaining whether there are problems with bringing philosophy into schools. In other 
words, it is understandable that philosophy brought to schools comes across as a 
colonizing gesture. 308 Diversifying philosophy, not just with respect to who moves through 
the ranks of academic philosophy but also in who we read as philosophers, is an important 
endeavor if we want to take the underlying focus on equality seriously within Rancière and 
CPI studies. 
 As I have shown, there are commonalities between CPI and Rancière. It would 
seem that we are left with the idea that CPI might be a good idea and provide for 
emancipatory moments, but that these moments will still always be in the context of 
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imperfect social institutions (e.g. schools). The way CPI gets justified and introduced is 
through arguments that it makes more democratic citizens, produces better results, helps 
students progress, and so on. None of these reasons that are used to justify the practice of 
CPI fully encapsulate what is good about it. Is CPI still worth doing in U.S. K-12 schools, 
then? Should Rancière inform CPI?  
It is my view that both Rancière’s critique and his positive conception of 
philosophy can be useful in helping us to think about our own use of the term, particularly 
when advocating for its practice within schools. Rancière brings to light the political 
commitments entailed by our characterization of the narrow method and practice of 
philosophy. While one might say that everything reflects our political commitments, it 
appears to me that the focus on philosophy brings to the surface the genuine question as to 
whether philosophy entails a value-neutral set of skills. Rancière has said of his works that 
they can be useful in prompting one to reexamine “philosophy’s political role,” wherein 
philosophy can be seen as an act of real politics that runs contrary to, or in spite of, the 
police order.309 Advocating for philosophy in schools, if we heed Rancière’s critique of 
philosophy, ought to entail a consideration of whether we are endorsing or trying to 
challenge the police order. How well are we, or can we, philosophize in the Rancièrian 
fashion while in schools? What does Rancière’s critique really do for us if we are still 
trying to make schools better despite their limitations? 
                                                     




As I have argued, CPI can be seen as a response to the problematic elitism, 
obsession with method, and objective view of truth found in traditional philosophy. 
Moreover, in the context of schooling, I have argued that the intention of using CPI 
following Rancière’s critiques is to avoid inequality and stultification, and to challenge the 
police order, in part by rejecting the objective picture of truth, the role of explanation on 
the part of educators and administrators, and the obsession with progress. Whether we are 
putting CPI into practice in new or existing schools, we can be mindful of the underlying 
critiques and values motivating our work. 
Critics of traditional philosophy may indeed feel that an appropriate alternative 
practice ought to be egalitarian rather than elitist, ought to value assertion rather than 
reified methods, and ought to prize creativity or sitelessness rather than an objective notion 
of truth. For those who favor this alternative model of philosophy, there may be concern 
that this simply is not possible in these traditional schools. What I have argued is that this 
practice of philosophy is largely possible in existing and new schools if one adopts CPI. 
The question of whether this favored, alternative form of philosophy called CPI is possible 
in schools should thus be seen as a challenge. As I have shown, possibility is sometimes 
glorified as a feature we want to preserve in schools, as a kind of hope for change and 
novelty. Rancière helps us to recognize that ultimately, philosophy is always possible – in 
schools and out – and it is something that we cannot control, force, or measure. Possibility 
is not measurable, but more of an assumption. We can implement CPI in order model 
certain values that philosophy naturally entails, just as we can implement our own 
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